The Prophecy of Hector Bywater

Who was Hector Bywater? Bywater was a British writer who became a specialist in naval affairs at the beginning of the 20th century. Through his novel, “The Great Pacific War”, Mr. Bywater detailed the future Pacific war between Japan and the United States.

Bywater moved to America from Britain as a teenager. The young reporter's first journalistic endeavor was covering the Russian-Japanese war of 1904 for a New York paper. The war began with a Japanese surprise attack on the Russian Navy on Russian Bases off Korea; the young Japanese Navy defeated Russia in short order (foreshadowing the strategy Japan would use against the American Navy nearly 40 years later). Later, Bywater covered European naval development and even became a spy for Britain before the World War, using his journalism career as a cover. His goal was to report on Germany's naval progress for the British high command. (During this period, the Imperial Germany naval buildup was designed to challenge British control of the seas if any future conflict ensued.)

While both Japan and the US fought on the same side in World War I, there were tensions developing between the two nations afterward. Both the US and Japan established bases in the Western Pacific. The US conquered the Philippines as a result of the Spanish-American War and established a base on Guam. Meanwhile, the Japanese were fortifying bases in the Carolina and Marshall Islands. For some American planners, the problem became not just how to defend Hawaii but to supply Philippines in any future conflict.

Bywater covered the great naval conference of 1921 in Washington. Using sources developed over the years, he revealed the American strategies and the eventual terms agreed upon by the Great Powers even before the final agreement became known. At the same time, Bywater released his first book, Sea Power in Pacific, which covered Japanese-American naval strength and speculated on a future rivalry between the nations. His work was widely read by experts in the field including Franklin Roosevelt, the former secretary of the Navy. Roosevelt, like most of the experts of his day, felt that a Pacific would produce a deadlock between Japan and the US and that neither nation would be able to prevail in a conflict - a thought with which Bywater disagreed.

The conference produced a final set ratio for naval power between Japan, Great Britain and United States: a capital ships tonnage of 5-5-3, where the US and Britain were granted strategic advantages over all other powers. The ratio reflected Western nations' need to protect two oceans; it ensured that Japan's Pacific strength matched both Britain's and America's. Bywater applauded the final naval ratio, believing it could reduce tension between the two Pacific powers. He also warned against any appeasement in dealing with Guam and the Philippines. Bywater predicted that the Japanese would insist that the US not be allowed to fortify these islands, as this would tip the strategic advantages in the Pacific arena to Japan.
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Bywater felt that many in American naval affairs underestimated Japan. As the 1920s progressed, his theories warning of a major war between Japan and the US conflicted with those of many who felt that the Great War would be the last major conflict. The original American naval strategy to aid the Philippines through a major thrust across the Pacific was flawed. Bywater believed that plan was foolhardy because Japanese control of key Pacific islands would block any efforts to help the Philippines. He concluded that final victory would come through an island-hopping strategy that would mirror the plan Gen. Douglas MacArthur would use successfully 20 years later in World War II. (Some in the Marine Corps had suggested this strategy during war planning in the 1920s; the plan was dropped in favor of the prevailing strategy of making a straight shot across the Pacific.)

Article Author: Tom Donelson

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