Of course, the Middle East today is very different, but the lesson of 1956 remains relevant today: that, on the rare occasions when U.S. leaders have the guts to stand up to the bluster of Israel, to insist on respect for the United Nations and international law, to take their case to the American people and the world, and to back up their demands with the threat of economic sanctions, even the most conceited and warmongering Israeli government has no choice but to cave in.
If Obama would only learn that lesson, he might yet be able to achieve the lofty goal he set for himself of bringing peace to the Middle East.
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Article comments
— go to most recent comments1 - Ruvy
Lucy,
You used Ilan Pappe as your book to hustle for this article - a sign that you probably would get your history wrong. And, sure enough, you did.
Let's fix the story for you, so as to bring it into line with the facts of history, instead of the fanciful tales of the lying Ilan Pappe, and other anti-Israel and self-hating Jewish propagandists like him.
The Brits and French were outraged that Nasser had nationalized their Suez Canal and Suez Canal Company. They wanted to take it back, but needed some way to distract Egypt so that they would only have one flank to watch, from the west. So the French and Brits turned to Israel, asking them to attack the Sinai Peninsula - an attack planned for October, 1956. What was in it for Israel? The French promised to sell Israel aircraft and other heavy weaponry. That relationship lasted for a whole nine years when the French decided to screw over the Israelis on an aircraft deal in 1967. But I get ahead of myself, here. Let's get back to 1956.
The Israelis attacked the Gaza Strip and the Sinai, as per deal. They attacked the Gaza Strip to put an end to Arab terror attacks across the border from fidayun terror units. First let's hear from David ben-Gurion, the prime minister who authorized the attack on Sinai. From the text:
Ben-Gurion on the Results of Sinai Campaign
(March 5, 1957)
On 1 March [1957], with the Government's authorisation, the Foreign Minister announced in the United Nations Assembly the evacuation of Sharm el-Sheikh and the Gaza Strip, in compliance with the Assembly Resolution of 2 February.
Before discussing the contents of this announcement, I must briefly deal with the motives which brought us to these two areas, how the thing happened, and how and why we continued to occupy them for over four months.
On the morning of 28 October I submitted to the Government the plan for the Sinai operation. As I have already stated elsewhere, this was not a campaign of conquest but a campaign of deliverance.
Like many others, I believed that the Czech-Egyptian arms transaction greatly intensified the danger to our security, and we made desperate efforts to acquire the minimum armament supplies required to deter the enemy, as well as other guarantees for our security. In the latter aim we were completely unsuccessful.
On 15 October 1956 I reviewed in the Knesset our efforts to obtain arms, but I pointed out that, although we were not so defenceless as we had been at the beginning of the year - "Egypt alone still has an enormous superiority over Israel both by sea and in the air, and even on land. It has destroyers and submarines, it has heavy tanks British, Czech and Soviet it has Soviet jet fighters and bombers superior in quality and quantity to anything we possess, and if we add the constantly increasing armament of the other Arab countries, we have still more cause for anxiety."
Directed at Our Heart
In these very days the tripartite military alliance between Egypt, Jordan and Syria was signed, the armies of these three countries were placed under Egyptian command, and their rulers openly declared that they could now choose the time to wipe out Israel. We realized that the enemy's sword was not only hanging over our head but directed straight at our heart.
A glance at the map of Israel is enough to show clearly the immediate danger that faced us in those days: sudden attack by these countries under Egyptian command could easily have cut the country in two at the narrow strip in the neighbourhood of Netanya; our airfields and our two coastal towns, Jaffa-Tel Aviv and Haifa, where most of our population is concentrated, could have been bombed, thus obstructing the mobilization of reserves, who are the sole foundation of our security in view of the smallness of our regular army.
Such interference with the mobilization of our reserves and the bombardment of our airfields would have left us helpless against the aggression unless we had struck out first at the aggression. And the Sinai campaign became a condition of our very survival, an action in self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. I am certain that any other people in our position would have acted likewise.
In the course of five days, we defeated three Egyptian divisions in Sinai and the Gaza Strip. We destroyed all the fidayun bases, and destroyed or captured large quantities of Egypt's military equipment, including land, sea and air armament.
Essential, Justified and Worthwhile
The Sinai operation was essential, justified and worthwhile, if for this reason alone, and I doubt if any army has achieved such great and important results with so few though such precious casualties: 170 killed and 1 prisoner - as the Israel Defence Forces achieved in the Sinai operation. This was a campaign of deliverance for it saved Israel from a direct and immediate danger, crippled the enemy's aggressive capacity for no short period, and, in my opinion, inflicted a heavy blow on the prestige of the Egyptian dictator, who aims at dominating all the peoples of the Middle East, as well, perhaps, as the entire African continent. And had the Sinai campaign given us no more than this it would have been enough. It would have been justified. And the atmosphere of tension in which we lived for a full year, as the military power of Egypt grew week by week, slackened after the Sinai operation, and we were relieved.
Before the Sinai campaign began, when I placed the matter before the Government, I was asked and perhaps rightly what would be the fate of the Gaza Strip, the islands of Tiran and Sanafir, the coasts of the Straits and Sinai as a whole. At that historic Cabinet session on the morning of 2 October, I told the Government that in addition to our physical security "We are interested in the coast of Eilat and in the Straits" "The essential is freedom of navigation" "That is the main thing, even if we are not stationed there (at the Straits) we should have free passage."
I said that the plan of operation included the expulsion of the Egyptian invader, but I added that the Gaza Strip was an embarrassing objective on that occasion I used the English word "embarrassing" because even then I had no illusions about the tremendous difficulties involved in view of the circumstances within the Strip itself.
I have no need to enlarge on the execution of the Sinai operation; it is recorded in the pages of history. It combined brilliant planning by the Staff and extraordinary performance by the officers and soldiers on the battlefield. The whole world, both friends and enemies, recognize the skill and the heroism of the Israel Defence Forces. The standing which those Forces enjoy today in the eyes of world opinion is, I believe, uniquely high; and this is another welcome result which should not be scoffed at.
Anxieties Not Unfounded
When I reviewed the Sinai operation in the Knesset on 7 November of last year, I ended with the following words:
"It may be that in the near future we shall have to face a difficult political struggle, and perhaps something even graver. We shall not give way to the futile arrogance of the Arab rulers, but on the other hand we shall not humble ourselves before the powerful forces of the world, when justice is not on their side.
"Let us meet the days ahead with courage, with wisdom in the consciousness of the justice of our cause and of our strength, without ignoring our natural and necessary bonds with the world family of nations."
These grave anxieties have proved not unfounded. While the campaign was still in progress the Security Council was summoned with a view to putting an end to the operation and imposing sanctions upon us. The Resolution was not adopted owing to a veto in the Security Council, and the UN Assembly was immediately summoned to an emergency session. The President of the United States turned to us in an urgent appeal, and, as you know, we were confronted with the demand to evacuate Egyptian territory and retire behind the armistice lines, and we informed the President and the Secretary-General of the UN, with the approval of all parties in the Knesset, with the exception of Herut and the Communists, that we would evacuate Sinai when suitable arrangements would have been made with the UN forces. In a communication to the Secretary-General of the UN we defined suitable arrangements as "arrangements that would safeguard Israel against acts of hostility on land and sea", and we had two things in mind: free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran and the Red Sea, and the ending of the danger of the fidayun and the Egyptian aggression bases.
[Bold font mine, Ruvy]
The imperial designs of the of the British and the French were frustrated by their utter fear of the United States and the USSR. They ran out of the Suez at the first bark of the Soviet-American dog - even though the Russians' hands were still bloody from their invasion of Hungary to restore communist rule there.
However Israel did not pull back so easily, in spite of the bluster of the United States and the Soviet Union. I remind you again that while the British and French cowards ran away at the first bark of the American dog, and got nothing for their efforts.
The Israelis stayed until March, 1957 when they had secured their objective.
They did not walk away from the Sinai Campaign without reward. But let's return to ben-Gurion's narrative, shall we?
Difficult Position
From a formal point of view, we were in a difficult position at that time. There was an Assembly Resolution, several times repeated, demanding our immediate withdrawal behind the armistice lines. The British and the French, who had seized part of the Canal and Port Said, withdrew without further ado in compliance with the UN's demand. We needed time and no little time to explain to world public opinion: a) the fact that we had acted not as aggressors, but in self-defence, and that it was Egypt which had for eight years carried out belligerent operations against us; b) the fidayun danger and the Egyptian dictator's aggressive plans; c) the vital importance of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Tiran Straits. And I am happy to be able to say that in the course of the four months since the end of the Sinai operation we were largely successful in this task.
Four months ago only a few persons here and there in different countries were aware of the very existence of the Straits. Little by little public opinion throughout the world came to understand the importance of the Straits for the shipping not only of Israel but of the nations in general, and our right under international law to free passage in this international waterway.
Rights Recognized
This was one of the most successful information actions on a world scale carried out by the Government of Israel and its representatives during these months. Most of the people of the free democracies and the great organs of the press overwhelmingly recognized our rights to freedom of passage and the importance in general of shipping in the Gulf and in the Straits. Apart from the achievement of the Israel Defence Forces, I doubt if anything received greater publicity during these months than the question of navigation in the Gulf of Eilat. This is an asset of great value that we have won as a by-product of the Sinai operation, and is additional to the principal goal, the saving of Israel from the aggression of the Egyptian dictator and his allies.
A second point which we have succeeded in bringing before world public opinion in the course of these four months is the danger of the fidayun, who were organized, trained and sent into the field by the Egyptian authorities, not only in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai bases but also in the neighbouring Arab countries of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. What fidayun activities spread over seven years more than 3,000 raids on Israel between 1949 and the end of 1956 could not do (for daily acts of sabotage and individual acts of murder were no sensation for the world press) was done by our information work in the course of the past months, thanks to the tremendous repercussions of the Sinai operation.
......................
Conflict Grew Sharper
After we had evacuated the whole of the Sinai desert apart from the coastal strip of the Straits, the conflict between ourselves and the United Nations and especially between ourselves and the US Government grew sharper. In my political review in the Knesset on 23 January, I said, speaking of the coastal strip: "We have no interest in occupying this strip, and we wish to evacuate it at the earliest opportunity, when we receive effective guarantees against any interference with Israeli and international free passage, such as prevails now in this international waterway."
On the Gaza Strip I said: "In compliance with the stand of the Assembly, Israel has no intention of maintaining armed forces in the Gaza Strip but, for the good of the inhabitants of the area and their neighbours outside it, the Strip must be occupied by Israel, appropriate relations being established between the Israeli administration and the United Nations."
Since then our political efforts have been concentrated on two objectives, the safeguarding of the free passage in the Straits and an Israeli administration in cooperation with the United Nations in the Gaza Strip for three purposes: 1) security for Israel in general and the settlements of the south and the Negev in particular, 2) the rehabilitation of the resident population of the area, 3) the solution of the problem of the Gaza refugees by the United Nations, to which Israel would make its contribution.
On 2 February, the UN Assembly again adopted two Resolutions: the first deplored Israel's failure to complete the withdrawal behind the armistice lines in spite of the Assembly's repeated demands, and insisted on the completion of Israel's withdrawal without further delay; and in the second Resolution the Assembly recognized, inter alia, that the Israeli withdrawal must be followed by measures to ensure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions.
Reply to the President
On the following day, on 3 February, I received a letter from the President of the United States couched in friendly terms but containing a grave warning. The President stated that the Resolution of 2 February was submitted to the Assembly by the United States and other countries with a view to bringing about peaceful conditions in the Middle East, but that the first step must be the completion of the Israeli withdrawal behind the armistice line.
In my reply to the President I pointed out that to our great regret the UN organs were adopting a double standard, and discriminating between Israel and Egypt. For the last eight years the Egyptians had been violating the UN Charter and the armistice agreement, defying the Security Council, engaging in hostilities against Israel, denying our ships free passage in the Suez Canal, and breaking their pledged word given in 1950 to the U.S. Government in regard to free passage in the Gulf of Eilat.
All this had been done for the purpose of destroying Israel by force while those who had the power and the authority had done nothing to prevent these grave violations of international obligations. Though Israel was a small country, it was entitled to security, liberty and equality of rights in the family of nations. Like any other independent State, we were free as of right, and we asked whether the United Nations Organization was going to discriminate between one nation and another.
The main question was whether the Egyptian Government was prepared to put an end to its acts of hostility against us. Only in this way, and not by a return to the status quo ante, was it possible to ensure peace in our area. For these reasons we are unable to complete the withdrawal without prior satisfactory arrangements.
Considerable Sympathy
A Resolution demanding sanctions against Israel was submitted in the Assembly, but our contention against the imposition of a double standard met with considerable sympathy in the world, in almost all the free countries, including the United States. We declared that we would not be deterred by the threat of sanctions. On 10 February, Mr. John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State, made an attempt to break the deadlock. He informed our representative in Washington that the President had read my letter with attention and sympathy, and a reply was prepared in the form of a memorandum which was handed to our Ambassador and published a day or two later.
(The Prime Minister then briefly summarized the main points of Mr. Dulles' memorandum of 11 February.)
The talks with the American Secretary of State to clarify various points in his memorandum lasted several days, and we stated our attitude in a written memorandum that was handed to the Secretary of State and later published. In this memorandum we expressed our appreciation of the United States' positive approach to the problem of the Gulf of Eilat and the Straits as an international waterway, and the statement on American use of the free passage with the cooperation of other States; we also welcomed the Secretary's statement that the UN Force would be stationed at Sharm el-Sheikh.
We pointed out, however, that the recognition of the right to free passage in itself did not guarantee free passage for Israel, as had been seen in the case of the Suez Canal; therefore it was essential that the UN Force should remain in the area until a peace settlement had been arrived at.
As for Gaza, we emphasized that this strip of land had never been Egyptian territory, and that Egypt was not entitled to claim any rights under the armistice agreement after violating the agreement throughout the years, and maintaining a formal and actual state of war against us in violation of the Security Council's decision.
The Egyptians must, therefore, on no account be restored to the Strip, which they had transformed during the period of their occupation into a base for aggression against Israel.
In view of these talks the Assembly's sitting was postponed. On the other hand, the demand of the Arab and Soviet bloc for the imposition of sanctions grew in strength.
Arriving at an Agreed Settlement
On 18 February, I sent a Note, with the approval of the Government, to the Secretary of State, urgently asking for the postponement of further deliberations in the Assembly and the despatch of a committee, which should if necessary also visit the Straits, so as to arrive at an agreed settlement of the problems of Sharm el-Sheikh and the Gaza Strip.
In this letter I stated that if the United Nations Organization, with the support of the United States, should impose sanctions upon us, it would be committing a historic injustice which would undermine the moral basis of the international organization.
In the light of the recent talks I felt that there were grounds for hope that an agreed solution might be arrived at after a thorough investigation on the spot, and that the delay involved was worthwhile in order to save Israel and the United States from a most tragic development.
I received no reply from Mr. Dulles to this appeal, but two days later, on 20 February, I received a long message from the President of the United States to the effect that, in response to my letter of 18 February, the United States delegation had supported the proposal to postpone the Assembly's sitting; a long-term postponement, however, was out of the question, and in the absence of an affirmative decision on the part of the Israel Government there was no certainty that the Assembly's deliberation would not involve grave consequences.
It was the President's hope that we would immediately announce our compliance with the demand for withdrawal, and rely on the resoluteness of all friends of justice to bring about a state of affairs which would conform to the principles of justice and international law and serve impartially the proper interests of all in the area. In this message the President stated that, after consultations with Congressional leaders, he intended to broadcast to the American people on these questions.
[further elucidation is no longer necessary]
The language is a bit formal, Lucy, but you should be able to discern the point. The United States tried to coerce the Israeli government to desist from its essential needs to bend to American will. And that just did not happen.
There are a few things that this incompetent, Obama, can learn from President Eisenhower. He can learn to attempt to meet our security needs half-way, or even more than half-way, and come away with an agreement that preserves peace and perhaps even extends liberty.
His incompetent deputy showed his inability to do this, and Obama's own agenda of bowing and scraping to the Arabs prevents him from doing so. Thus we in Israel will be justified in telling the United States to go to hell. Not just the United States - the less-than-great Britain, France - the whole lot of the imperialist whores out there.
2 - El Bicho
I'll bet no one reads that entire comment
3 - ralph
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND MUSLIM COUNTRIES NOT ONLY CALL FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL ,ROCKET ITS TERRITORY AND COMMIT SUICIDE ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAELI CIVILIANS SINCE YEARS AND THE "COMMENTATOR" HAS THE
CHHEEK TO REMIND EISENHOWER'S DECISION ?
WILL THE HYPOCRISY OF SHUCH PEOPLE NEVER END ?
4 - Ruvy
Lucy,
I forgot to add. The Arab leaders did not learn from the shellacking Egypt got in 1956.
Nasser died from diabetes in 1970 with the entire Sinai under Israeli control, and with the canal he stole from the Brits and the French absolutely useless.
Hussein of Jordan expelled the British commander of his army in 1957, and lost the three western provinces of his kingdom to us in 1967 (I live in one of them), after being warned not to attack - and not heeding the warning.
Hafiz Assad continued to bombard our villages in the Huleh Valley, and we conquered the Heights of Golan in 1967, and annexed it to our country in 1980. He died having lost the territory in the Golan the British had handed over from Mandate Palestine to the Syrian Mandate in the early 1920's.
Unfortunately, our leaders have forgotten the toughness ben-Gurion displayed in the face of foreign pressure. If they do not remember soon, it will require a "scouring of the shire" to install Jewish leaders who can stand up to the world like men instead of wheedling kikes.
Cheers!
5 - Lucy
That's one hell of a comment Ruvy. I will have to go back and read through it later.
As for the choice of book, i don't approve of this site forcing us to link to an Amazon book so i pay little or no attention to what book i choose, it comes down to whichever my mouse clicks on first. It could have easily been any other on the page at the time.
6 - zingzing
jesus, ruvy... "[further elucidation is no longer necessary]"
no shit. next time, just use a link or something. or summarize your thoughts in your own words. that was excessive.
7 - Ruvy
I wanted to drive home the point, zing. Most people do not open links.
jesus, ruvy...
Stop bringing my dead relatives into all this....
8 - Realist
Reb Ruvy:
As much as I understand your differences with this post, you have the same venue to post your own views without turning this comment thread into the Washington Times. I think you would be better served by using it as I would in your case.
9 - zingzing
ruvy: "Stop bringing my dead relatives into all this...."
zombie jesus loves you, wants to eat your brains. aim for the crown! if he bites you, do you turn into a christian?
10 - roger nowosielski
Jesus may be the only one left, because I surely can't.
11 - Ruvy
Realist,
Do check out my venue for the latest, and then, if it really interests you, go check out Arutz Sheva. It's not as much fun as the California fiscal crisis, but it keeps us "laughing" anyway....
One of the commonest tools of anti-Israel writers is to distort history. I know little about Lucy and am unwilling to pre-judge her, but the British media are largely anti-israel a priori. So I cannot determine whether her views are merely a reflection of the media she reads normally, or her own opinion - or a combination of the two. Before she speaks further, I will not make assumptions. I was wrong already once. I have merely attempted to undistort history here.
I hope you are doing well and wish you a good week.
12 - jeannie danna
Ruvy,
Look at number one! What happened, wouldn't they publish an article for you?
13 - jeannie danna
Ruvy,
I forgot to add?
This is very interesting, Ruvy. It appears that you can bash America morning, noon and night, but if anyone displeases your "love of country", then watch out!
14 - Realist
@Reb Ruvy
Things are better, thank you.
I did check out "Time To Tell America To Go to Hell", and I left you a comment prior to our exchange here. I guess you missed it in the excitement.
15 - Ruvy
Realist,
Please check out comment #35 at my article. I certainly did not miss what you referred to.
Have a good Sunday.
16 - Arch Conservative
How offensive to the English language to view the words Obama and learn in the same sentence.
17 - zingzing
archie, you're just being childish now. if you want to complain about obama, at least have something to complain about. it gets rather tiresome if you don't.
18 - Lucy
Ruvy, i have read back through your very long comment and my post to try and see where the historical innaccuracies were.
You admit that Israel attacked Egypt as part of a deal with the French & British. I used the term colluded. Deal probably makes it sound a bit more above board possibly but we agree here.
I then used text from Eisenhowers own speeches and the trail through the UN
so hard to find any inaccuracies there.
It seems to me, maybe wrongly, that the offence was to the language i used which doesn't portray Israel's actions in a very good light.
I explained the choice of book previously. It could easily have been any other book on the page as i chose one at random to fulfill the basic requirement of blogcritic to insert a book title from Amazon.
19 - Ruvy
The point, Lucy, was not that you painted Israel in a good or bad light. That is not really important. The point is that Israel did not pull out of Gaza Strip or Sharm-el-Sheikh until the following were agreed to:
1. The right of Israeli navigation through the Straits of Tiran;
2. The demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula with a UN force placed as a buffer between Israel and Egypt on the Egyptian side of the border;
3. The destruction of the Arab fidayun (terrorist) camps and cells in Gaza.
In other words, while England and France got virtually nothing for their adventure in Suez but black eyes, pulling out at the first bark of the American dog, Israel achieved some measure of security for nine years. And, in addition to this, they did not pull out of Gaza or Sharm-el-Sheikh until they achieved this measure of security. They invaded at the end of October, 1956, and pulled out in March, 1957. Eisenhower could have jumped up and down all he wanted and imposed any sanctions he wanted. Ben-Gurion stood his ground in the face of an interfering American president. Eisenhower, a general who had commanded soldiers, had the sense not to look like a bully in the eyes of the world.
Contrast this to the imperious bombast of the American vice president in interfering with zoning in Jerusalem, and with the arrogance of the American secretary of state in attempting to do the same. The Americans do look like bullies in pushing around Israel, and Obama, who does not know the first thing about commanding soldiers, is managing to make America look rotten in the eyes of many in the world.
But to make the picture sadly complete, you also need to contrast the cowardice and pathetic inability of the sitting prime minister of Israel to deal like a man with the pathetic incompetents screaming at him as though he were the pariah. It makes Netanyahu truly look like a midget against ben-Gurion, and it makes him look truly pathetic against his own brother, Yoni Netanyahu, z"l, hy"d, who died in Kampala airport in 1976.
20 - Ruvy
Let's put it this way, Lucy. Had Churchill behaved as Netanyahu (or Olmert or Barak) has, you would have hung your head in disgust and contempt.
21 - zingzing
"The Americans do look like bullies in pushing around Israel," who look like bullies and dimwits totally uninterested in peace.
"Obama, who does not know the first thing about commanding soldiers, is managing to make America look rotten in the eyes of many in the world."
while i'm sure there are people with different opinions of this new construction, you must be blind not to see why the us and palestine would be pissed.
and do you want your leaders to be military?
22 - Ruvy
In fact, Lucy, now that I think of it, if Churchill had behaved like Netanyahu and the other cowardly yahoos who think they "run" Israel, you would be speaking German, and we wouldn't be having this conversation at all. My parents would have murdered off in a Nazi-run concentration camp in America.
I hope you had a pleasant Sunday, and bid you a successful work week.
23 - zingzing
"My parents would have [been] murdered off in a Nazi-run concentration camp in America."
speculative fiction is sketchy stuff. not that the nazi war machine wasn't impressive in its own way, but do you really think they could have invaded and held the us?
24 - Ruvy
[Personal attack deleted by Comments Editor]
and do you want your leaders to be military?
Most of Israel's leaders have been military commanders of one kind or another. David ben-Gurion commanded the Haganá, MenaHem Begin commanded the Etze"l, both YitzHak Rabin and Ehud Barak were chiefs of staff of the IDF. The career path of many politicians in Israel is charted in the higher ranks of the IDF.
In fact, many believe that Yoni Netanyahu, a very charismatic soldier who did not hide his nationalist beliefs, was purposely set up for execution by Peres and Barak when they sent him to Uganda in July 1976 - specifically to nip his possible career in the bud. The idea fits the kind of mind-set that Peres has. And it should be remembered that Peres the vulture, was the Security Minister, and Barak was the planner in charge of the operation to rescue the hostages in Uganda.
25 - zingzing
but alright, if you don't like how i put it above, what's your theory on why america is pissed at israel over the new construction? is it:
a) this construction is a stumbling block that will get in the way of the upcoming peace talks, or,
b) america hates the jews and can't stand it when they do anything.
maybe you have another answer, and if so, i'd like to hear it. but it's painfully obvious from all the words that have gone back and forth between israel and the us, that "a" is the correct answer.