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Poland’s Strategy, Thinking Outside the Geopolitical Box

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Merely some 25 years after the halcyon days of Ronald Reagan, Pope John Paul II and the fall of Communism,Poland finds itself in strategic trouble as Russian power grows and American involvement in Europe wanes. Then there is the European Union teetering on the brink of breakdown. This is not how things were supposed to be, but history is back with a vengeance. What should Poland do to assure its independence in the future should it find itself having to rely on its own means?

George Friedman in his recent article “Poland’s Strategy” frames Poland’s security problem succinctly and offers three solutions: “For Poland, the existence of a powerful Germany and Russia poses an existential problem, the ideal solution to which is to become a buffer that Berlin and Moscow respect. A secondary solution is an alliance with one for protection. The latter solution is extremely difficult because dependence on Russia or Germany invites the possibility of absorption or occupation. Poland’s third solution is to find an outside power to guarantee its interests.”

How workable are these solutions? Let us consider the last two options. Alliance with Moscow is virtually impossible for an independent Poland, given its recent history: Poland has spent five decades of the 20th century under de facto Russian occupation as a rearrangement of borders and power on continental Europe in the wake of Second World War forced option two on Poland. Not only is any movement toward Moscow by Polish politicians likely to play badly within Poland, especially among those 30 to 40 percent of the Polish electorate who support the Law and Justice Party, it is also unlikely for the simple reason that Russia’s attitude toward Poland has been tainted in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Poland has proven itself to be an unreliable friend and ally. It is also hard to imagine such a turn given Poland’s NATO membership. Those facts leave Berlin as a potential ally, but in simple terms Germany’s interests will not be better served if it privileges Poland’s concerns over the benefits of friendly relations with Russia. In fact, Berlin did not privilege such concerns when it came to the Nordstream pipeline. Of course, Poland needs to be a good neighbor to Germany and Russia, for that matter, but these policies should not lead to passiveness among Poland’s political elites when it comes to long-term strategic thinking.

But in the two decades since gaining independence from Soviet control, Poland has been passive, its thinkers resigning themselves to narratives of reliance on security guarantors, the third path that Geroge Friedman has identified. Today the US and NATO provide this security guarantee, but its future is uncertain, dependent entirely on how much expense and effort America will wish to expend in order to defend the European continent against Russian designs. This may turn out to be very little, in comparison to the effort expanded during the Cold War, for Russia and the United States are no longer locked in a do or die struggle of ideologies. The balance of forces has shifted as China’s growing economy is creating a new pole of global power and America’s interests are shifting toward Asia as a result. Given this shift, the help of a friendly Russia could serve America’s balance of power interests vis a vis China. One could, of course, raise the objection that Poland is secure within the EU community, but the EU is a military nonentity mired in an economic crisis.

Relying on guarantors in the long term always presents dangers. These dangers result from two issues: one, national interests may change in a way that no longer makes adhering to guarantees in the interest of the guarantor. Two, the guarantor may not be in a position to act quickly enough.

Interests of guarantor states are formulated internally through ideological conflicts between the factions of its ruling elite. These conflicts play out in the marketplace of security narratives inside the policy-level circles of the guarantor state. Unless a client state has a significant capacity to affect the internal policy-making of the guarantor state by controlling the narrative told about it in the context of geopolitical interests of the guarantor state, reliance on guarantors for security becomes profoundly risky. In the case of the US as Poland’s guarantor, for example, Poland’s narratives about security and geopolitical risk and the interests of the US being served by engagement in that part of the world compete against the narratives of other client states who would wish to involve the US in other parts of the globe as their security guarantor. Recently, when the Obama administration wished to reset America’s relations with Russia, Poland’s security narratives were subordinated to security narratives that framed concessions to Moscow in light of strategic necessity. This led to disappointment in Warsaw, a development that was predictable.

Such disappointments are the necessary outcomes of guarantor security policies gone wrong, and such policies will go wrong more likely than not, because the calculus that affects the power of guarantors always changes. If it was impossible for the US and Russia to be friends in the 1980s, for example, such a friendship could become necessary if China’s power continues to grow and the US chooses to pursue a balance of power approach to managing China. The worst case scenario for Poland is falling through the fissure that could open should the EU break apart and America’s interests oblige it to withdraw as a security guarantor for Europe. Such a development would leave Poland completely vulnerable to Russian influence. If the EU were stronger, more centralized a political union, Poland would be more secure within it to be sure, even in the absence of America in Europe, but the EU is not a strong political union and its main reason for being, that of a common economic zone united by a single currency, is in question, partly as a result of the lack of a centralized political authority able to address the economic crises in Greece and Spain.

Finally, even if all other factors are held constant, reliance on guarantors is also risky because guarantors may not be able to project the required military force quickly enough. This happened in 1939 and could conceivably happen again in the future. The US today does not have the right mix of forces close enough to protect Poland from a sneak decapitation strike. For example, if Russia positioned Iskander batteries in Kaliningrad, it could strike Polish military assets in minutes, before they could react, essentially decapitating Poland’s military capability, presenting NATO with a fait accompli. Would a fall of Poland matter to US interests? George Friendman writes that it would, but in certain contents, such a loss may not matter.

Which brings us back to the first solution, the most optimal one, that of a buffer that both Berlin and Moscow respect. But how to create such a strong, independent Poland?

Perhaps becoming such a buffer means a nuclear arsenal? Marek Jan Chodakewich writes in Radek and Berlin, his analysis of Poland’s geopolitical problem, “Poland should help itself by developing its nuclear energy potential and procuring its own nuclear weapons in lieu of American protection. It needs to learn how to play the game of strategy.”

There are, of course, enormous international political problems with the nuclear strategy. But holding all those potential issues constant, the most important question is this: would a nuclear deterrent force really make Poland safer and better off? Or would another strategy be so much more beneficial?

Poland can do better by pursuing a technological superiority strategy. Such a strategy makes supreme sense because technological superiority equals economic prosperity and the ability to create a significant military strategic advantage. A Poland that is a leader in key technologies would certainly be respected in Berlin and Moscow without having to resort to the kind of confrontation that a nuclear deterrent idea would likely create.

One key component of this strategic focus on technological and scientific superiority would be the reorienting of Poland’s long term priorities to emphasize the creation of an environment that privileges advanced research and development as a top policy priority. Poland could, in this context, work toward the goal of becoming the most important research and development location in Europe (and latter the World) in one or two specific areas of scientific and technological research. The first step would entail the creation of world-class academic research programs in a chosen area. Such a policy of investing in the creation of world-class academic research centers would have a highly desirable subsidiary effect, that of creating a magnet for the world’s best and brightest who wanted to do cutting edge work. This, in turn, would attract venture capital, for it always follows the talent. The inflow of talent and money would dramatically increase the Polish GDP as startups and innovation would make Poland a destination site for research and investment. The second step would involve integration of effort across various labs and research centers across the country toward one centerpiece project, such as a disruptive superweapon of a defensive nature.

It is important to note here that this superweapon need not necessarily be a classical military weapon such as stealth aircraft or a ship or a nuclear submarine. According to US Gen. (Ret.) Walter Jajko, writing in StrategicSurprise: “Novel, unconventional or nontraditional application of a technology also can produce surprise, sometimes with strategic effect.” Using Jajko’s framing, we live in an age when clever and visionary thinkers can take off the shelf components and create a disruptive system to change the rules of the game. Because, according to Jajko, “ in the conduct of contemporary warfare, the traditional tactical, operational, and strategic levels are inseparable; each one may have an effect on another, rather than only at its own echelon. This flexible “interoperability” allows for opportunities to cause strategic surprise.” An ingenious application of extant state of the art technologies in a revolutionary configuration could be so dramatic and disruptive in its effect that it could create a strategic surprise. An asymmetric capability can also be rooted in a significant scientific breakthrough. Whether based in existing technologies configured in new ways or in a fundamental breakthrough, it is clear that a technology disruptive enough can have a profound force multiplier effect.

One objection to a superweapon strategy is that Poland is too poor to make the required investment. But Poland’s state budget, according to analysis by Poland’s Republican Foundation, is filled fluff items such as media and cultural spending, items that are, for a nation such as Poland, given its existential security problems, as Friedman calls them, hard to comprehend. Rather than spend billions of zlotys on sports, recreation, culture and media wouldn’t Poland be better off investing these funds into the development of state of the art science and technology capability? Priorities need to change. Change, however, is unlikely to be easy as the Poles themselves are more likely to be skeptical of such significant projects, not only due to potential financial costs, but also because such a projects may seem too assertive for Poland to pursue.

Regardless of objections that may be leveled, the reality is that whatever the costs would be of creating a well-funded research program with the context of an area of research and innovation, not attempting to come up with such a disruptive defensive technology will carry even greater costs: the costs of losing the great game, of being invaded again, carved up or otherwise rendered from the world stage by aggressively imperialistic states could mean the Polish people and an independent Poland forever cease to exist. To survive and thrive in its unique geopolitical reality, Poland needs to innovate in science and technology, make a breakthrough, and force a paradigm change that balances geopolitical security threats with technological solutions.

Unlike the security guarantee strategy, which requires nothing of the political elites of Poland, the technological superiority strategy requires significant effort and determination by succeeding governments of Poland. And Poland simply doesn’t currently have nor is likely to have in the future the kind of leadership it would need to reorient priorities. Friedman suggests one reason why Poland is more likely to chose a less optimal guarantor strategy: Poland lacks a “national will” to undertake a serious effort. Poland’s elites have a historical record of profound complacency and disunity (the latest bone of contention and hostility is the matter of the 2010 Smolensk air crash) and, as they did during the 1930s, are therefore more likely to seek security policies that require little of them but are ultimately catastrophic and costly strategic failures than to seek outside the box solutions to Poland’s geopolitical security dilemma.

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About A. Jurek

A. Jurek is one of the editors at Blogcritics. Contact me at: a.jurek@blogcritics.org
  • Jon

    Everyone seems to underestimate the German-Polish relationship. German exports to Poland are nearly three times larger than they are to Russia and German businesses are highly involved in Poland. Many German companies use Poland’s rather inexpensive yet highly educated workforce to produce the goods needed to keep German companies competitive. Russia’s primary role for Germany is a source of energy. As Germany continues to push renewable energies, Russia becomes less important. Also, if Polish Shale turns out to be commercially viable, Poland could replace Russia as an energy provider. I believe that since Law and Justice has been ousted from the Polish Government, the German-Polish relationships has really blossomed and will continued to become deeper.

  • odrzut

    Poland has GDP 30 times smaller than USA. Poland military budget is 1.95% of GDP, USA military budget is 4.9% of GDP.

    That makes for 73 times smaller military budget. USA tries to develop this “star wars” defense system since at least 1983. Poland would start now.

    How long do you think will it take for Poland to develop such system, if USA couldn’t do it with 70 times bigger military budget, trying for 39 years?

    It’s not that Poland don’t have good technology companies. Radar companies here are quite good, for example. But we don’t even have one military satellite.

    Nuclear weapon would be much easier. Poland already have powerful research nuclear reactor Maria in Swierk near Warsaw. It can be used to produce nuclear weapon grade material. We already give out to USA and Russia isotopes that are byproducts of this reactor and could be used to make atomic bomb (we do this to comply with nuclear anti-proliferation program). Poland could probably make an nuclear weapon in decade or less. But this will likely result in dyplomatic isolation, so it’s better to make a few such weapons in secret, if we choose to go that way, and only reveal them when ready.

    Poland depends on NATO, USA and Germany for its security. Germany depends on Polish big market and cheap educated workforce, so this alliance can be stable at least in mid term. USA isn’t stable, cause we don’t have anything important to give them.

    Still – Germany can pivot, and we can’t only depend on them. Poland created Vyshegrad group with Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. We try to create military partnership with Sweden. We try to encourage Ukraine for more pro-western and democratic attitude. We help Baltic states with security (for example by air policing their sky). These are all important things, and succeeding there helps Polish security – the more powerful are the buffor states between us and Russia, the more secure we are. But in the end if Russia wants it – it can attack us, and if USA or Germany don’t help – we’re doomed.

    One strategy for Poland that hasn’t been discussed is partnership with China. China is already important for Poland cause Russia can’t use all its force in Polish region, because of China interests in Siberia. China also has some economic ties with Poland (but not big for now, and very one-sided). Anyway – for now economical expansion is more important for Poland, because with current economy we don’t have chances with Russia nor Germany anyway.

  • A

    My point is simple, odrzut, Poland must create a serious research program centered around key technologies. Poland is not doing that now but could. And research is not about huge financial outlays but talent. Where is the top talent in Poland right now? Are they able to do state of the art work or do they beg for funds or even leave the country?

    Nuclear weapons would be a terrible idea for a variety of reasons. Becoming China’s client would be just as bad.

  • odrzut

    But in the end money do matter. Talent matters as well, but talent won’t work for free.

    Yes, Poland has cheaper labour than USA (roughly 3 times cheaper) – let’s say we do everything with Poles, and use only national equipment, so from 73x adventage for USA it goes down to 20x adventage for USA.

    Let’s say past research was less efficient than now, because of worse computing technology back then – so assume USA research since 83 was 1/10th of what we can research today for same amount of money.

    That makes USA 4*20 = 80 years ahead, and USA still goes 20 times as fast as Poland. So we can expect Polish laser anti-missile defence near 2090 at best.

    No way Poland can do this without international cooperation. Sorry.

  • A

    odrzut, Poland has no choice but to invest in research if it wants to compete in the global knowledge economy. That’s just a basic fact. And if it can’t compete, after its best and brightest leave it will cease to exist as a viable state.

  • A

    odrut,

    as far as your point about international cooperation, you’re wrong in thinking that the state of the art technologies would be shared or licensed. For example, if Poland wanted to develop a state of the art AESA radar capable of tracking any stealth aircraft at more than 500 miles (which would make that project a superweapon project), it would need to do much of the key work on its own, even if it could get BAE or some other European company to share its technology know how. As far as costs, Poland would need to commit a billion euros a year to making the radar project happen. It does have that kind of money. So a disruptive breakthrough in radar is not impossible. And when it would happen, Poland would have a way to address Russian stealth aircraft threat.

  • odrzut

    Yeah, we have to invest. But there’s more to research than SDI.

    And it’s counterproductive to waste money on investment that we already know we won’t be able to finish in next 20 years. It’s not some revolutionary scientific theory that requires one genius. That would be highly unlikely, but still possible on small budget.

    It’s just engineering. Huge amount of engineering and experiments. You can predict how much work engineering requires, and we know it’s too much.

    You seriously overestimate Polish economic capabilities, if you think we can finish such program before USA. Or even in the same decade. So what’s the point? To develop sth usefull as a side effect of failed program, and spin off companies around this? I agree – that’s the way to go, but we can do this around almost any technology, no need to start with unachievable goal.

    So I suggest we should instead invest into projects that have bigger chance of being actually finished. Like at least 5% chance.

    BTW: According to your condition Germany, Russia, China, Turkey can’t compete too, cause they aren’t making their own SDI systems.

    BTW2: in fact Poland will probably develop its missile and aa defense system. But it’s conventional off-the-shelf system based on missiles and cannons, not on lasers. And Polish military industry will only make the parts we already can do, or have experience developing – like radars (not all), short range missiles (Grom and its future upgrade Piorun), aa cannons, battle managment systems, vehicles, etc. The most crucial elements (medium and long range missiles) will be probably licenced or bought.

  • Robert

    Just few quick comments:

    –The author of this article has not much knowledge of Polish history. If Poland relied on outside forces aka friends for its independence it would seize to exists long time ago in this neighborhood. Lessons from WWII and pack with England and France though Poland a big lessons that I hope will not be forgotten soon.

    –It is very unlikely that Poland and Germany would be in any conflict in a foreseeable future, I think not only the politicians but also people of both countries care about good relations and hopefully learned the lessons from the past. The rhetoric of parties such as PiS in Poland even if it would be in power would not have much effect on the official position it only plays towards populist views of older population which is a big minority now in Poland.
    Both countries are located physically too close to each other that any modern warfare in one would have extreme consequences on the other.

    — The only possible danger for Poland is what will happen with Russia in a future. But this would not be only a Polish problem but a global one and I would be very surprise if Poland was the only country that would need to deal with it EU in general, China and USA would have much more at stake.
    Assuming that Russia is the possible future treat the NATO is nice to be in club, but real security would come from good relationship with Germany and other countries such as Slovakia, Czech Republic, Sweden (other north European and Baltic countries) and Ukraine. Basically the counties in the region that would also be effected.
    Also what happens in Belarus could matter for Poland, where Poland should try to make Belarus as much independent from Russia as it is possible this creates the extra buffer.

    — As far as nuclear weapons and such, I would be very surprised if Poland did not had capability / plan of putting a device together in a mater of hours if something happen. All NATO countries have American weapons designs also Poland had access to the Soviet weapons in the past.

  • A

    odrzut,

    A THEL system is perfectly achievable for Poland. In fact, Israel already has the technology.

    BTW, How is it that Israel, with an economy 1/3 that of Poland, can find the money for such a project but Poland can’t?

  • Glenn Contrarian

    A. Jurek –

    I suspect you are working with an outdated premise in that the world has gone through a sea change in the past fifty-odd years. Consider this – relatively speaking, can you think of a single twenty-two year period in all human history that has been as peaceful as the world as a whole has been since 1990? Even given the Rwandan massacre, our wars in the Middle East, and the ongoing ‘Arab Spring’?

    In relative terms, no. I suspect that (again, in relative terms) the world has entered a period of peace unprecedented in human history. I do not say there are no wars or that there will be no wars – such would be a silly notion, of course. I do say that the major nations of the world – America, China, Russia, and the rest of the first-world community – have learned from the devastation of general wars between each other and a new kind of war has emerged: economic wars.

    I believe this is due to two major factors – the explosion of knowledge and understanding throughout the world as a direct result of modern mass media and the internet, and nuclear weapons. The first factor has educated – one might say ‘inoculated’ – many, many people to the horror and stupidity of war. The second factor is as JFK said, a sword of Damocles hanging over the head of humanity.

    We’ll still have wars and unspeakable crimes of humanity – as long as there is humanity we’ll have such – and sooner or later some idiot will get hold of one or a few nukes and use them (fear not the nation with a thousand nukes, but the one idiot with one nuke), but I believe that thanks to the media, the internet, and nuclear weapons, and as long as some total nutcase doesn’t get his finger on the nuclear trigger of America, Russia, or China, the world will continue this unprecedented period of relative peace.

    And how does this concern Poland? I say they don’t need to research advanced defense weaponry at all; instead, they should invest in ever-greater education for the masses, infrastructure for the businesses, and subsidies for emerging technologies…for today, the stock exchanges and free markets of the West are the modern version of what was the Arsenal of Democracy in WWII.

  • A

    Glenn,

    When you consider the major technologies that we have today, from computers, to internet to cell phones–all these technologies were first developed as secret DARPA projects. Why? Because only government sponsored research programs can take the risk of investing in technologies that have no immediate payoff but may have enormous future benefits. That’s the benefit of having an advanced weapon program. Even if such a weapon program fails, the advances in knowledge, spin off technologies and other benefits will be game changing.

  • Glenn Contrarian

    A. Jurek –

    Because only government sponsored research programs can take the risk of investing in technologies that have no immediate payoff but may have enormous future benefits.

    I agree wholeheartedly with that statement – would that our resident BC conservatives could have such a leap of intelligence!

    But the sentence immediately following – “That’s the benefit of having an advanced weapon program.” – is fallacious in the modern world in that investment in technologies does not require investment in defense-related technologies. Nations no longer need to invest in ICBM’s in order to learn how to put satellites in space. Nations no longer need to invest in battlefield medicine to learn how to address epidemics. Nations no longer need to invest in nuclear weaponry in order to take advantage of the very real benefits of nuclear power for their electrical grids (I know, that’s not a normal liberal talking point, but I like and support nuclear power).

    This is not to say that advanced defense research doesn’t bring us benefits – of course it does! – but in the case of Poland, I would say they’d be better served by allowing defense-related tech advances to ‘trickle-down’ (ugh! but the term serves), and by investing instead in more readily-available technologies that would be more cost-effective for their society.

    P.S. – when it comes to the ‘battlefield medicine’ research I mentioned above, I strongly recommend The Great Influenza by John M. Barry – as a result of reading that book, I’m a heck of a lot more worried about the different influenzae (esp. H5N1) than I am of any nuclear arsenal.

  • A

    But the sentence immediately following – “That’s the benefit of having an advanced weapon program.” – is fallacious in the modern world in that investment in technologies does not require investment in defense-related technologies

    True enough. And I never said anything about reinventing the wheel. But I think that the new breakthroughs that will be game changing will come from such advanced technology research programs.

  • A

    The reason why defense projects are so superior to civilian research is that a defense project is usually so complex that it requires parallel developments in other areas. In the civilian world, few companies have the vertical integration necessary to successfully innovate in more than one area and those that do are able to do so only because they receive large defense contracts.

  • Glenn Contrarian

    A –

    The most cost-effective high-tech weapons program I can think of would apply to information warfare – think “Stuxnet”. But thanks to the flow of information in the modern world, I think that advanced technology research programs are no longer a necessity for development of game-changing technologies. It depends on the game one’s playing, I’d say.

  • Glenn Contrarian

    A #14 –

    I agree with you on that! But my point is simply that Poland – with a much smaller economy – would be better served with more cost-effective efforts towards education and infrastructure.

  • A

    Glenn,

    Education is of course one of the fundamentals. Any country that makes the effort to invest in increasing the quality of it is well served.

  • Betcy

    Poland’s budget for 2009 was 303 billion zlotys or about 100 billion dollars. It’s military expenditures were 5.14 percent of the budget or about 25 billion zlotys or less than 10 billion dollars. To fund any sort of “superweapon” program would require a doubling of the defense budget to 10 percent of the state budget so that about 10 billion dollars would be available each year for this project.

    Such a doubling of the defense budget would require cuts in other areas, unless Polish economy started growing at 7 percent or more. Assuming no economic miracle that would tripple the size of Poland’s economy in less than a decade, what could motivate such drastic cuts elsewhere in the budget?

    Perhaps if Russia decided to go to war, such cuts would happen. But then that money would most likely be used to buy weapons abroad, not to try and develop any.

    In other words, yes, in theory, this is a good strategy, but only for nations with economies of exceeding two trillion dollars. Britain and Germany could develop a superweapon and these countries do work on various advanced weapons projects. Eurofighter comes to mind. Despite enormous expanditures, however, the Eurofighter is dud.

    Poland’s best bet is to invest in increasing the quality of her universities and making Poland more business friendly. Another potential idea could involve creating a charter city in Poland with special legal rules wherein residents can come from any nation bypassing any immigration laws and pay no taxes–a libertarian utopia for the geniuses of the world–such as the idea proposed by Peter Thiel. That would certainly lead to a lot of capital flowing into Poland and ton of innovation and perhaps an economic miracle.

  • odrzut

    > Another potential idea could involve creating a charter city in Poland with special legal rules wherein residents can come from any nation bypassing any immigration laws and pay no taxes–a libertarian utopia for the geniuses of the world–such as the idea proposed by Peter Thiel. That would certainly lead to a lot of capital flowing into Poland and ton of innovation and perhaps an economic miracle.

    Poland already has “no tax zones” in most big cities, where investment into specific industries is allowed without paying taxes for a few years (5 years if I remember correctly). Near Stalowa Wola air and defense industry is concentrating in such a zone.

    Of course that’s not exactly the same (more about companies than individuals).

  • Radek

    Superweapons…the writer of this “article” clearly has very little comprehension of what he or she is writing about.

  • Betcy

    Jurek’s idea comes right out of the Cold War siege mentality of Better Dead Than Read variety where hysterical national security narratives framed around Them coming to get Us lead to ever increasing defense spending. The only nation that today lives in something approaching that kind of a climate is Israel, facing as it does a real existential threat. But Poland is not Israel. Despite Friedman’s framing of the problem as an existential one, in reality the Poles feel no existential threat from Russia and if they do fear her nuclear arsenal or a possible conventional attack, they have resigned themselves to doom or domination.

  • Glenn Contrarian

    Betcy –

    Jurek’s idea comes right out of the Cold War siege mentality of Better Dead Than Read variety

    “Better Dead Than Read”? I thought that only applied to the Necronomicon, Chaucer, and the collected works of Ayn Rand….

  • Transatlantic Fella

    Russia is not what it once was. It is also uncertain whether Russia will remain capable of posing a threat to Europe and Poland in the future. For example, much of Russia’s military industrial complex’s manufacturing equipment is old, wages are low and the sector is having trouble recruiting the best and brightest.

    It is certainly possible that a weakening Russia will have to become part of the EU and the Atlantic Alliance in order for America and EU to check the growing economic and military might of China. But that kind of a Russia won’t be a threat for Poland.

  • A

    Betcy,

    Poland’s 2011 budget included nearly 9 billion zlotys for “culture and media.” Cutting that entirely would mean approximately 3 billion dollars for high tech research. The money’s there, but no will.