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Looking at the Anglosphere Part II

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Editor’s note: Part two discusses Anglosphere military advantages and India’s role in the Anglosphere.

Defense and Military Leadership

United States and the United Kingdom have the world best navies and their armed forces can operate worldwide for extended period of time. This allows the Anglosphere to operate in any theater of the world and deploy appropriate military response to defend their interest. Throughout the world, there are Anglosphere nations at key junctions. Australia faces long-term serious threat in the Southeast Asia as they are in the neighborhood of heavily populated and underdeveloped Asian nations. The United States has bases throughout the world but in a world of shifting alliances and changing world crisis from Far East to the Middle East, a strong Anglosphere alliance will give the Americans dependable and capable allies in crucial areas.

British armed forces are capable of working with American military and probably the only European nation that has the ability to operate with the highly technically advanced American armed forces. Australia provides an Anglosphere armed force that can also be incorporated within strike force in key areas in the Middle East and Far East. The two Gulf Wars showed that presently, the Anglosphere is the dominant military power and that the Anglosphere needs to expand the alliance as the limits or resources are starting to appear.

James Bennett writes, “The United State is facing pressure to reduce the universality of its commitments, combined with a certain fatigue among the populace for the extensive nature of American alliances… Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom has already reached the point where it is greatly limited in its ability to go it alone on any major military commitment; its armed forces are explicitly in existence to serve as leverage in a variety of alliance situations.” Bennett correctly assumes that any primary alliance should focus on nations that share the greatest shared value and the Anglosphere has just an alliance in place.

What were the lessons of Gulf War II? Ralph Peters in his excellent series in the NY Post during the second Gulf War summed up his view when he wrote, “Saddam had a classic 20th-century, industrial-age war plan. But our forces fought a 21st-century, post-industrial war.” Peters dismissed the notion that Saddam did not have a plan or that he did not put up much of a fight. Peters states, “Far from technically incompetent, Saddam’s plan was right out of Clausewitz. Its models were the lessons of the Russian defeat of Napoleon in 1812 and the Soviet victory over the Germans in the Second World War. The principles were: Delay your enemy, slow his forces, trade space for time, harass his supply lines and husband your best forces for a mighty counterattack. Wait until the attacker has advanced so far into your country that he reaches a “culminating point” at which point he has lost his momentum and his supply lines are overextended. Then strike. Saddam didn’t so much plan the defense of Baghdad as he tried to re-fight the defense of Moscow.”

General Franks observed that Speed kills and Colonel Peters followed this thought by observing, “But the campaign the U.S. military fought cast off the rules of the modern era. We fought the first post-modern war. In the final grudge match between Clausewitz and GI Joe, it was a shutout. And no other military on earth could have done it…. The Russian advisors [to the Iraqi army] fail to grasp the profound changes in our military and the American way of war. …They clearly had no sense of battlefield awareness, speed, precision and tactical ferocity of America’s 21st century forces.”

Indian writer Pramit Pal Chaudhuri wrote in India’s Hindustan Times, “Russia provides the type of weapons needed for mass wars of millions of men, thousands of warplanes and tanks. What New Delhi is looking for today is smart weaponry, stuff that will allow it to attack a terrorist camp with smart missiles or stealth-drop commandos. This is exactly what Russia cannot provide. As it is, even the warplanes it sells now have to get their more advanced avionics and missiles from Israel or France.” Many nations will re examine their military strategy and the weapons that go with it. Countries like India are now studying our tactics to adopt for their very own. The Anglosphere superiority in technology allows them to be able to fight any kind of war in any place of the world.

Keegan viewed the second Gulf War as an old fashioned war when he agreed with Frank’s assessment, “Speed Kills” when he wrote, “the blitzkrieg effect being achieved simply by speed and efficiency of execution.” The speed with which this battle took place was breathtaking. Keegan stated, “The dash from Kuwait to the vicinity of Baghdad was done at a speed unequalled in military history. The convoys, moreover, brought not only ammunition, water and food, but also the tanks, loaded on to transporters, without which there would have been breakdowns…The US Army transport services pride themselves, justifiably, on their ability to deliver necessities on time and over distance.”
What will be viewed is the flexibility of the American forces. As the old adage goes, a plan fails to survive the first bullet flying and this was certainly the case. The war began with a strike on Hussein’s headquarters in an attempt to cut off the head of the regime and when Turkey failed to allow the 4th Army to break from the North, Franks had to change the game plan.

Franks went on a fast break, combining a lightening strike toward Baghdad with armor forces combined with air support. Meanwhile special ops were operating all over the country in a silent war, and small paratroopers combined with special ops worked with the indigenous Kurdish fighters in the North. In Afghanistan, special ops rode on horseback as the flyboys used the latest technology to target the Taliban. In Iraq, the old and the new combined in a similar synergistic form.

What was seen is that the present day American military can now fight any style of combat. While one Russian observer stated that Americans were cowards depending sorely on technology and did not like to go street to street, this war proved that the Americans, borrowing from their British allies, learned street fighting. They did the dirty work while losing very few men. Contrast this to the Russians. 50,000 people may have died in the Chechen Republic during the 90’s including 5,000 Russian soldiers in similar urban combat. The British and Americans showed that one could fight in an urban environment without destroying everything and still secure the major centers. As George Patton is supposedly quoted, “You don’t win wars by dying for your country, you win wars by allowing the other poor bastard to die for his country. “ Americans and the British can fight in the urban center, in open ground, and on the sea as well as the air.

Vladimir Dvokin, the head of the Russian Defense Ministry’s think tank reflected the thinking of many in the Russian military when he said, “The gap between our capabilities and those of the Americans has been revealed, and it is vast. We are very lucky that Russia has no major enemies at the moment, but the future is impossible to predict, and we must be ready.” Mr. Dvorkin lamented that the second Gulf War demonstrated the archaic structure of the Russian military force.

Israeli defense officials expressed similar amazement when they witnessed one of the more powerful Arab countries conquered by what amounted to fewer than three American divisions. Major General Dan Harel told a reporter that he was jealous of the American military. He said, “They have advanced in areas that we were leading in only a few years ago. They have the ability to put everything together in command and control. Our navy and air force have systems. But we have to integrate them.” Israelis were impressed that the Americans lost slightly over 100 men whereas the Israelis lost six times as many in the Six Days War. Both friend and foe will study this war for its appropriate lessons. Even the urban war that has followed has seen Allies casualties less than what they should be while inflicting higher causalities upon the terrorists thugs they are fighting.

What the Americans do have is ingenuity. Stephen Ambrose in his many books on World War II continuously observed that under the strain of combat, the American soldiers who were raised in freedom, constantly were able to adapt more freely to conditions on the ground than their German counterparts. Technology is not all that wins wars. It also takes the soldier on the ground to make it work. The American soldier is raised in a world of technology, so a strategy based on technology is second nature and this shows in combat as well. The American soldier brings this strength into battle.

Fred Kaplan details that the origin of both Gulf War victories began in the early 80’s. With the advent of digital technology, a new war-fighting doctrine was born. With the defeat suffered in Vietnam, a whole generation of officers determined never to repeat Vietnam’s mistakes. Among those were Huba Wass de Czege, who wrote a major revision that broke the Army’s previous strategy of attrition warfare, setting up static lines against the enemy’s assault, and repulsing it with superior firepower. De Czege began a new strategy that emphasizes lightening strikes behind enemy lines and emphasizing speed. Speed Kills. When the first Gulf War began, many of De Czege’s students were part of Norman Schwarzkopf’s staff and the Gulf War was a combination of superior firepower matched with feints and the classic deep strike behind Saddam’s army, still in Kuwait.

With the advent of smart bombs and their increased use in the combat the military could better target its weapons while employing deception. Increased accuracy also meant less civilian causality. Fred Kaplan said of this strategy, “Operation Desert Storm was really two wars—the air war and the ground war—each fought autonomously and in sequence. Gulf War II was an integrated war, waged simultaneously and in synchronicity, on the ground, at sea, and in the air. The vast majority of air strikes, from Air Force bombers and attack planes as well as Navy fighters, were delivered on Iraqi Republican Guards, in order to ease the path of U.S. Army soldiers and Marines thrusting north to Baghdad.” As mentioned previously, synergy of all of the services became a reality. In addition Fred Kaplan stated, “Another new thing, which started in Afghanistan and continued in Iraq, was the systematic inclusion of the so-called “shadow soldiers,” the special operations forces. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which was best-known for giving new authority to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also made special ops a separate command, with its own budget.” The warriors of the night became an integral part of American strategy.

A pundit recently pointed out that an army that combines the use of Dolphins and satellites is a tough army to beat. This is an army that is capable of using what is available to fight. Americans use old-fashioned “Yankee know-how” in war as effectively as they do in business. The entrepreneurial spirit that exists outside the military has now made its way into the military. Anglosphere nations power lies not just in its economics prowess but its military as well.

What Gulf War II showed is that the future war on terrorism will be fought with actual combat, imaginative diplomacy, and through actual subversion of terrorist sponsor states. The combat tactics of Gulf War II demonstrated that the United States has the capability to either strike with the thunder of armed columns or the lightning speed of special ops operating in the shadows. To win the war on terror in the 21st century we will need armed forces that can essentially fight under any and all conditions. Nothing replaces a well-trained soldier carrying out the policies of diplomats; but without the soldier, diplomacy is nothing more than an empty bluff.

India and the Anglosphere

Mr. Bennett does not yet consider India formally part of the Anglosphere but for the Anglosphere to dominate the 21st century, India must be cemented to the Sphere. Bennett writes, “In such a commonwealth (Anglosphere), should the Indian choose to engage it, It may well be that the Bangalore becomes a major center of the Anglosphere in thirty or fifty years time. Anglospherists do not fear this, knowing that just as London is still great today because it shares an Anglosphere with New York and Los Angeles, it and the American metropolises will be great tomorrow partly because they might share it with Bangalore.”

Indian writer Gurcharan Das remembers attending Henry Kissinger’s lectures at Harvard in the early 60’s and listening to Kissinger point out that Nehru was a dreamer and “it is dangerous to put dreamers in power.” Kissinger’s own views on Nehru may have been misplaced and he admitted it in his most recent book on Diplomacy. Nehru was not an idealist and certainly not a pacifist like Gandhi. When force was needed, Nehru was prepared to use it. Three wars with Pakistan, including the liberation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, one war with China, and pushing the Portuguese out of Goa showed that India was not afraid of using military force. What Kissinger called a foreign policy of dreamers was a serious attempt to buy time for the new nation, residing as it does in a tough neighborhood. Kissinger’s own opinion from his Harvard days changed when he stated that Nehru’s policy, “during the Cold War was not so different from that of the United States in its formative decades.” The difference is that in the United States formative years, there was an ocean between America and Europe. India, on the other hand, was located in a land populated by vipers and political rivals.

The United States, as the leader of NATO and the premier Western power, has inherited the traditional British interest in ensuring that no one single nation dominates the Eurasia landmass. India, also, has co-opted policy from its former English master. In 1934 Britain designed a plan to stabilize the Sino-India border and to dominate the Indian Ocean from Aden to Singapore. India’s present naval building effort reflects those same objectives. Like the United States, India does not want to see an Islamic fundamentalist revolution sweep through the Middle East. As China grows in strength and challenges the United States in the Far East, China also threatens India at her northern borders.

A recent stumbling block that stood in the way of Indian-American relations was India’s ownership of the bomb. Kissinger noted that India, “will not risk it’s survival on exhortations coming from countries basing their own security on nuclear weapons.” Kissinger concedes that India is acting rationally and that President Clinton’s reaction to India’s possession in 1998 and expansion of its nuclear capacities was “emotional.” While Clinton would tell the Indians that they did not need nuclear weapons, India’s own reaction was to ignore Clinton’s appeal. As far as Indians were concerned, they were not under the American nuclear umbrella and were facing two nuclear rivals, Pakistan and China in their own backyard. Bush’s Administration removed the various sanctions put in place in 1998 due to the events of September 11th.

The biggest problem with nuclear non-proliferation is the unrealistic approach that good intentions are enough to ensure enforcement. The 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act requires the imposition of sanctions against any nation that pursues and acquires nuclear weapons. These sanctions include denial of World Bank aid, restricting bank loans and technology exports. The problem with this approach is that it does not distinguish between friend and foe. India’s nuclear program is designed to protect against growing Chinese military clout, and the desire to counter Pakistan’s intentions in South Asia. Nuclear weapons are India’s entry into the superpower club and India’s nuclear plan does not threaten America. New Delhi’s actions are not motivated by any desire for a military confrontation with the United States, now or in the future. Washington has tolerated nuclear weapons in the hands of the Soviet Empire and Red China, so why not India? India’s nuclear possession does not threaten American interests any more than do France and England with their nuclear capability. France’s own nuclear plan was based simply on the idea that France and only France is responsible for its own security. England also did not choose to live strictly under America’s nuclear umbrella and India is merely following its own national interest in becoming a nuclear power.

The final solution is simply the adoption of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The use of technology to checkmate present missile technology allows the United States and her allies, including India, to maintain its military superiority while giving potential nuclear powers a reason not to proceed with their own program. SDI allows the West an insurance policy against any cheaters. The days of depending upon mere pieces of papers for security are over. A missile shield allows the United States to protect its own interest, while securing a nuclear umbrella to protect other nations, including India. The reason that the nuclear club has not gotten even bigger is that America’s nuclear umbrella has been extended to potential nuclear powers such as Japan and Germany. There is no need for those countries to be nuclear powers in their own right as long as they are allied with the United States. Finally, a strategic defense initiative protects the United States in a world of changing alliances. China has made it clear that it is considering challenging the United States role in East Asia and its own nuclear and military buildup is predicated upon its own military objectives that are not necessarily in sync with ours. SDI allows a sensible policy of containment if that is what is required in the future. SDI also allows for reduction in nuclear weapons since it allows nations an insurance policy against cheating and reduces the utilities of nuclear weapons.

A new nuclear non-proliferation policy begins with the principle that we can no longer keep the nuclear genie in the bottle. There are some nations in whose hands nuclear weapons may in fact be a stabilizing factor. In the 19th century, Europe was dominated by a concert of leading powers, whose goal was to maintain the peace and European stability after the end of the Napoleonic wars. What is required today is a concert of democratic states starting with the Anglosphere and including other democratic states like India. In this new era of terror, stability is dependent upon this new concert acting in harmony. And certainly, this concert of power should include other alliances with other nations not just limited to the Anglospheres. While military options will always be considered, the ultimate protection is a new concert of democratic states prepared to defend what is right under the umbrella of a Strategic Defense Initiative and backed by the United States led Anglosphere.

The final piece to India’s greatness will be the evolution of its relationship with Pakistan, including how it deals with the Kashmir problem. Pakistan, formed as a result of the partition of 1947, has been a dysfunctional society, cash strapped and living in the shadow of India. For millions of Indians and Pakistanis, the partition had its own human tragedy, ending in the deaths of hundred of thousands, if not millions. Pakistan’s present strong man, Pervez Musharraf, migrated from his home in India to Pakistan, whereas author and business consultant, Gurcharan Das went in the opposite direction as a refugee. Nearly 40 million people traveled in either directions in a tragedy that today still threatens both the security and prosperity of India and Pakistan. India diverts billions of dollars of defense funds that should go into economic development and expanding its own influence outside the South Asia continent, to defending its borders with Pakistan. As for Kashmir, Pakistan’s claim is due to a heavy Muslim population, and some in Pakistan even view Kashmir as a part of a Greater Pakistan. India views Kashmir as part of its own territory and the Kashmir people, themselves, are uncertain about their own fate.

A democratic, moderate Pakistan would be a boon to peace in the region and possibly give India an extra market in which to trade. India is now the dominant power on the South Asia continent. An autocratic Pakistan that is economically dysfunctional is not in the interest of either the United States or India. Pakistan stands between the forces of Islamic radicalism and modernity.

Great Britain was the inspiration for both the United States and India in the values of freedom. Both nations now have the responsibility to spread those values throughout the world. A country of over a billion people will never be a junior partner in any relationship and, unlike Great Britain, India will be an equal partner based on its potential as an economic and nuclear power. With nearly a million Indians living in Diaspora throughout the United States, there is a personal connection being developed between these two nations. These immigrants live in America but much of their heart belongs to India. These people to people contacts further cement relations between these countries. These contacts also bring down the veil between these countries as well. As India learns more about the United States, we also learn more about India.

India will prove useful in battling terrorists and defending the West. India, for many years, has set itself apart from the West but in recent years, this is beginning to change. Gone are the days of reflective anti-American attitudes that infiltrated Indian leadership and there is a more balanced approach to world events. It will be imperative among American policy makers to entice India to a permanent member of the Anglosphere.

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About Tom Donelson