Schwartz also discusses the experiments of Benjamin Libet, who has shown that before people notice having decided to make a voluntary movement, preparation for the movement can be observed in the brain, though the actual movement occurs after the feeling of having decided. Some scientists, like Richard Restak, have used these results to argue that free will is an illusion, and that the feeling of having decided follows a decision made in the neurons. However, Libet himself believes that there is time in the sequence for the conscious mind to veto the otherwise automatic movement. Instead of free will, there is free won't. Our unconscious presents an agenda, and brings it to the attention of consciousness. The chief role of the mind is to inhibit wrong action.
Besides a detailed discussion of neuroscience, Schwartz makes several interesting philosophical arguments. First is an argument from evolution. If, as Edelman and others suggest, the conscious mind cannot affect the brain, how can it contribute to our survival? If it has no survival value, why would it have evolved? Schwartz rejects the notion that consciousness could be a spandrel, a term advanced by Gould and Lewontin to describe accidental byproducts of evolution that were not specifically selected for by evolutionary pressure. There's no way to determine who is right as yet, but to explain the most astonishing aspect of human existence--that we are conscious of our existence--as an accidental byproduct of evolution does indeed seem weak.
Second, Schwartz argues from quantum physics, relying on the assistance of a colleague, physicist Henry Stapp. According to the predominant interpretations of subatomic physics, the universe at its tiniest grain is not solid, but fuzzy, and comes into focus only when observed. Most physicists, not being psychologists, are content to leave unexplained how a brain actually observes anything. However, Schwartz paraphrases physicist Eugene Wigner asking, "If the position of atoms (and thus, for our purposes, the state and arrangement of neurons, since neurons are only collections of zillions of atoms) have no unambiguous existence independent of the consciousness of an observer, then how can that very consciousness depend on those same atoms?"
Article comments
1 - Lee Kent Hempfling
You should now read 'The Brain Is A Wonderful Thing' available at the URL to see how the brain works and how it is possible to misconstrue what the mind is in order to make claims such as are made in the book referenced in your article.
2 - seesir
interesting book and commentary. why should this artificial dicotomy continue? brain affects mind; mind affects brain! or whatever other terminology one wishes to use. there used to be the mind/body dicotomy. (hopefully that is diminishing.) why not accept rational viewpoints and try to integrate them? we are at the threshold of great things regarding the functioning of our brains. let's not get sidetracked with unnecessary philosophical talk.
3 - Eric Olsen
fascinating Rick, excellent job nad very glad you got theeye problem resolved. Ideas are energy and that isn't nothing.
4 - Ellis' REBT Cognitive Therapy
This of course, makes perfect sense (the mind affecting the brain's structure, I mean); if learning changes you, which, in a way, is the very definition of learning, obviously (?!) the brain and/or nervous system (and/or endocrine system?) has to have changed...
5 - Darin
I found the book illuminating and exciting because the implications of the thesis, if it were accepted by a diverse range of researchers in various fields related to the brain and mental functioning, can open new lines of study and research that may help people who would otherwise suffer needlessly from neurological malfunctioning. I myself reject Platonic and Catesian dualism, but frankly, the philosophic debate is less important than having the means of helping people, however important one thinks that debate is. Of course, if you outright reject Schwartz's thesis, then the very possibility of beginning new research will be ruled out and any hope of helping people remains straitjacketed simply because scientist's a priori biases take precedence over charity!! And that's really sad.
People are always more important than ideas. And the scientist who feels his ideas are that important betrays the very philosophy that gave the foundation for his or her ideas in the first place, namely humanism. To me, that's an egregious inhumanism and makes me wonder if science has become wholly superfluous by it's utter detachment from real human concern and by a bloated sense of it's importance as seen in the idealogical priorities of the scientist qua philosopher.