Many of the sources, Kennedy points out, also give the impression that "many of the areas conquered had suffered from a declining population in the century after the first appearance of the bubonic plague in the Mediterranean world in 540." Another factor was the series of wars fought between the Roman and Iranian empires. And then there were the internal battles among Christian sects. In many areas conquered by the Muslims, "the invaders benefited from internal tensions in the ancient empires, which meant that, in some cases, they were seen as liberators or at least as a tolerable alternative."
Part of the success, Kennedy suggests, lay also in the unique characteristics of the Muslim forces. Kennedy writes that "[e]nough has already been said about the religious motivation of the invaders, the power of the idea of martyrdom and paradise as incentives in battle," something that is, incidentally, all too frequently mentioned in our media in relation to Islam. It was this "combined with the traditional, pre-Islamic ideals of loyalty to tribe and kin, and admiration of the lone warrior hero. The mixture of the cultural values of the nomad society with the ideology of the new religion was formidable."
Contrary to what one might expect based on depictions and descriptions of Arabs and Muslims in Hollywood movies and Western media, the early Arab conquests were not, on the whole, exceptionally violent. Though "[d]efeated defenders of cities that were conquered by force were sometimes executed," Kennedy writes, "there were few examples of wholesale massacres of entire populations." Also, the new subjects were not, in most cases, forced to convert. Muslim authorities established working relationships not only with the former elite, but also with the heads of churches and other religious institutions. "Attraction, not coercion, was the key to the appeal of the new faith," though the desire to escape the poll tax, join the new ruling elite, and qualify for a military career were powerful incentives. In the end, Kennedy writes, "conquest did not cause conversion but it was a major prerequisite."
In The Great Arab Conquests Hugh Kennedy wades through the mass of often fragmentary, confused, and contradictory sources to provide his readers with a cautious and balanced, yet powerful and engaging narrative of the great Arab conquests. He has resurrected the use of the Arabic sources and treats them with respect, using them not just for the reconstruction of specific events, a task for which they are not always well suited, but rather as the foundation myths and social memory of the Muslim society by which they were created. This fascinating book is equally useful to the academic and lay reader.
Article comments
1 - ali soegiharto
when I looked at this book, I remembered that I have a book with the same title only written by another, a retired British General, Sir John Bagot Glubb. Published by Hodder and Staughton, and was first printed in 1963. Is it ok to write a book with a title that existed. I have no intention to disregard the quality of the current book, but merely curiousity of such happening.
2 - Abram Bergen
I think book titles on such a broad topic often overlap. Think of books on WWI or WWII. How often do they share similar titles? There is so much to be written, and so much new scholarship to be brought to bear on the subject, that books with similar titles can be vastly different.
I did a little checking and it appears that the title does not have a subtitle, as Hugh Kennedy's does. Also, Glubb's book focuses only on the first 50 years of expansion. And though I haven't read Glubb's book, I imagine his perspective to be much different from Kennedy's. Glubb was a British General under the British occupation of Arab lands, so his perspective is likely influenced by his personal colonial involvement, whereas Kennedy approached the subject from a strictly academic perspective. However, since I haven't read Glubb's, I cannot comment further. It would be interesting to read them side-by-side.
Thanks for bringing it up.