Lessons In Disaster is a work interrupted in the sense that the original intention of it being an analysis of why the Vietnam War came about (as seen by Kennedy and Johnson adviser McGeorge Bundy) came to an abrupt end when Bundy died unexpectedly. His partner, Gordon M. Goldstein, had no other choice than to turn this work into more of a history of the process, as Bundy had not left voluminous notes regarding his insights and understanding of the decision process.
As a history, Lessons In Disaster is a valuable addition to the archive, and Goldstein deserves much credit for producing this work. His research to fill in the blanks left by Bundy took many years and much deep digging to locate the pertinent information contained within. But it is only as a history that this book rates any interest. As an analysis and explanatory tome, it generates more questions than it provides answers.
In 1996, former Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, published his memoirs of the creation and conduct of the Vietnam War, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. Among the other things McNamara revealed was his behind-the-scenes opposition to continuing the war, beginning in 1966, while he remained publicly loyal to President Lyndon Johnson and the conduct of his war.
Bundy read McNamara's book and recognized that his major rival and policy opponent in the White House debates over the conduct of the war was actually in the same emotional and intellectual boat as was Bundy himself. This revelation was a factor in Bundy deciding that he needed to review his own performance and participation in this disaster, but he didn't manage to complete this task before the Grim Reaper arrived for him.
Luckily, Bundy had made an important decision, else what historical input he did produce would have been lost. In order to develop and organize his memories, Bundy had hired the future author of Lessons in Disaster, Goldstein, to assist with organizing and developing Bundy's poorly-organized collection of random remembrances and scatter shot review notes of official documents into an explanatory memoir written along lines similar to McNamara's own mea culpa. Said organization was no easy task.
Bundy's notes from both the time examined and from his later review reveal that he had to have been of two minds almost constantly while serving under Lyndon Johnson. In policy meetings, Bundy — like McNamara — would meticulously toe the official policy line, yet in his private musings he would question the efficacy of the effort.
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