There is also mention of the British in the book - the British army is fairly well acquitted but not its political leaders. During the final stages of war planning, the British military leadership is uncomfortable with the half-baked war plans presented to them, but the British civilian leadership attitude is more faith- based — faith in Bush's and his administration's competency, that is. They stake their support on the belief that the US would not take the momentous step of invading and occupying Iraq unless it was persuaded that it had a winning plan. If only they knew!
The authors of this book also got access to "Iraqi Perspectives" — a study done by US Joint Forces Command of how the Iraqi leadership managed its military establishment, sized up its foes, and prepared for war. This study has not yet been made public. They are able to present insider information from the Saddam camp for periods before and during the war. It was never clear to me as to why Saddam did not come clean if he did not have WMDs rather than risk his regime on a lie. It appears that for Saddam, the more immediate risks were an internal Shiite uprising and Iran, and he needed to carry on the charade of WMDs if he were to survive these two.
The US was a distant third on his list of dangers and he never really believed that the US would attack him. The internal palace conspiracies of Saddam also provide with an interesting comparison with the way the Pentagon worked under Rumsfield during war planning. In Baghdad, you dared not speak against Saddam or argue against his beliefs about how a war should be fought. Things were not so different at the Pentagon, where you risked being shunted out or at least shut off from the decision-making process if you did not believe in the gospel of lean, mean and a technically savvy armed forces. Moral of the story: always be open to opposing viewpoints, which obviously was not an option with the group of ideologues who have laid this administration to waste.
There is a lot more to read in the book, including evidence that the Bush administration was warned many times by many experts about the perils of post-war Iraq, about the need for many more boots on the ground after Saddam was gone (e.g., David Kay, the security expert who would later lead the CIA effort to investigate the mystery of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and who joined Garner's team as Mayer's boss resigned, determined to distance himself from a venture he concluded was headed for trouble. "I told Jay that it was headed for disaster," Kay disclosed. "There was a reluctance to divert resources to post-conflict maintenance of law and order and when you don't, you get organized crime and political chaos"), about the importance of restoring the infrastructure as fast as possible - but all those warnings fell on deaf ears.
Article comments
1 - Bliffle
What a sad story this administration has become. It's obvious that GWB himself has lost interest in this war, just as he lost interest in his oil companies and his TANG obligation. He just doesn't have what it takes to be in a position of responsibility and see a project through.
2 - Deano
It is interesting to note however that Rumsfeld was highly prescient on the advent of a lean, fast-moving, high impact force, supported by air power.
The US forces won the war in an astonishing short and well-executed campaign, despite a number of difficulties. The war itself was a remarkable feat. All the more remarkable given the entrenched resistance within the military itself to changing the strategic doctrine...most of the studies tend to agree that the significant, entirely forseeable failure lay with not having an effective force level to maintain order and security within the country in the post-Saddam power vacuum. Rumsfeld and the adminsitration were actively resistant to the concept of increasing troop levels or any activity that smacked of "nation-building", despite hearing from both the military, the State Dept., and many others that a post-invasion strategy needed to be implemented.
In the long run, the administration manifestly shot themselves in the foot due to short-term thinking, blinkered ideology and a reluctance to admit their own entirely preventable mistakes.
3 - John Spivey
With reference to Bliffle's comment, I spent a number of years teaching junior high kids. A significant number of them had learning differences. Whenever I see Bush speak I see one of these LD junior high boys. It appears to me that he has ADHD based on his kinetic activity and his short attention span and addictions. He might also have a bit of dyslexia based on his avoidance of reading and his seeming inability to really decode complex info. I am not demeaning those with these learning issues. I have seen many kids thrive when they learn the proper strategies. Bush seems to have learned to smile and glad hand as his way of coping. I don't think he really has learned the tools to see a complex task through till its successful end and we are all paying for it.
4 - Vikas Chowdhry
Deano:
The US forces won the war in an astonishing short and well-executed campaign, despite a number of difficulties.
Never mind that the war was against a third rate power, already depleted with years of Iran-Iraq war, the first gulf war and years of sanctions after that. This swift victory did not prove anything about the efficacy of a lean and mean army as espoused by Mr. Rumsfield.
5 - Deano
Vikas, Actually it does, despite your scoffing.
Was Iraq a third rate power - hell yes! This was no major victory over an intractable foe, The results were guaranteed due to the disparity in forces, weaponry, training and resources but that doesn't change the fact that the war represented a long-fought internal battle within the Pentagon over the strategic direction of US forces - moving from a massive monolithic force designed to meet Cold War threats (i.e. tanks in the Germany) to meeting the urban, low-intensity, evolving and rapidly changing mobile battlefields of the 21st century (i.e. lots of frequent, scattered low intensity conflicts). You may not think it is important but I guarantee you that military academies around the world sat up and took note.