As the Bush administration's Iraq policy continues to unravel, and April proves to be yet another cruel month for the US forces in Iraq with 69 deaths, Cobra II gives us an excellent ringside view to the key moments in war planning as well as to the scenes on the war front during many of the key battles. (The account of a second attack on Baghdad, Thunder Road, is particularly riveting.)
Hearing the arguments and counter-arguments over what was done right and what was not, whether the civilian leaders heeded the advice of military planners or not, if strategic or tactical mistakes were made or not, can be a mind-numbing experience. Cobra II painstakingly reconstructs the story behind the decision to go to war with Iraq starting from hours after the September 11th attack and unless this book is a work of fiction (which it clearly is not) a few things become clear over the din created by talking heads.
First and foremost, this war was not fought by taking recommendations of military planners into account. In fact, most of the recommendations of the military planners were brushed off by civilian leaders. Secondly, despite repeated assertions by leaders of the country, military leaders did not get the resources that they asked for. And finally, no one comes out with their reputations intact from this war, not the ideologues like Rumsfield and Cheney, not some of the military leaders like Tommy Franks and Richard Myers, not intelligent and supposedly moderate leaders like Colin Powell and to some extent Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and certainly not President Bush.
The facts are there for everyone to read in the book and it is clear that until this day, when politicians claim that they gave the military leaders what they asked for, they are lying and relying on the propensity of the people not to go into details of the matter. People are looking for sound bites, and that is what they get whether it be hours and hours of balderdash on cable TV or 30 minutes of network news. If you want facts about the Iraq war and its planning then this is the book for you.
Cobra II, written by Michael Gordon, the chief military correspondent for the New York Times, who spent the war with the Allied Land command, and Bernard Trainor, a retired Marine Corps Lt. General and former director of the National Security Program at the JFK School of Government, has a lot of facts, names and details but rarely has a dull moment (or as Rumsfield would frame it: Is it intense? Yes! Does it demand concentration? Yes! Is it boring? No!). Read this book, set all the partisanship and consipracy theories aside regarding the war and assume for a moment that it was necessary to wage a pre-emptive war on Iraq; then based on the case presented in this book, try to deduce the reasons for failure and you might come up with these two - incompetence and ideologues.
Article comments
1 - Bliffle
What a sad story this administration has become. It's obvious that GWB himself has lost interest in this war, just as he lost interest in his oil companies and his TANG obligation. He just doesn't have what it takes to be in a position of responsibility and see a project through.
2 - Deano
It is interesting to note however that Rumsfeld was highly prescient on the advent of a lean, fast-moving, high impact force, supported by air power.
The US forces won the war in an astonishing short and well-executed campaign, despite a number of difficulties. The war itself was a remarkable feat. All the more remarkable given the entrenched resistance within the military itself to changing the strategic doctrine...most of the studies tend to agree that the significant, entirely forseeable failure lay with not having an effective force level to maintain order and security within the country in the post-Saddam power vacuum. Rumsfeld and the adminsitration were actively resistant to the concept of increasing troop levels or any activity that smacked of "nation-building", despite hearing from both the military, the State Dept., and many others that a post-invasion strategy needed to be implemented.
In the long run, the administration manifestly shot themselves in the foot due to short-term thinking, blinkered ideology and a reluctance to admit their own entirely preventable mistakes.
3 - John Spivey
With reference to Bliffle's comment, I spent a number of years teaching junior high kids. A significant number of them had learning differences. Whenever I see Bush speak I see one of these LD junior high boys. It appears to me that he has ADHD based on his kinetic activity and his short attention span and addictions. He might also have a bit of dyslexia based on his avoidance of reading and his seeming inability to really decode complex info. I am not demeaning those with these learning issues. I have seen many kids thrive when they learn the proper strategies. Bush seems to have learned to smile and glad hand as his way of coping. I don't think he really has learned the tools to see a complex task through till its successful end and we are all paying for it.
4 - Vikas Chowdhry
Deano:
The US forces won the war in an astonishing short and well-executed campaign, despite a number of difficulties.
Never mind that the war was against a third rate power, already depleted with years of Iran-Iraq war, the first gulf war and years of sanctions after that. This swift victory did not prove anything about the efficacy of a lean and mean army as espoused by Mr. Rumsfield.
5 - Deano
Vikas, Actually it does, despite your scoffing.
Was Iraq a third rate power - hell yes! This was no major victory over an intractable foe, The results were guaranteed due to the disparity in forces, weaponry, training and resources but that doesn't change the fact that the war represented a long-fought internal battle within the Pentagon over the strategic direction of US forces - moving from a massive monolithic force designed to meet Cold War threats (i.e. tanks in the Germany) to meeting the urban, low-intensity, evolving and rapidly changing mobile battlefields of the 21st century (i.e. lots of frequent, scattered low intensity conflicts). You may not think it is important but I guarantee you that military academies around the world sat up and took note.