Donovan's research points out to the discerning that Custer's share of the blame, besides the well-known historical charges of rashness and impulsiveness, included not knowing the sorry readiness state of his command. He was on poor terms with most of his officers, and wasn't aware of their personal capabilities and deficiencies. In addition, most of the regiment's regular officers -- who should have known the condition and readiness of the Seventh -- were on detached duty elsewhere, so company command devolved in their absence onto the lower and less experienced officers. So many officers were unavailable for command that, in one case, an officer was borrowed from an infantry unit for temporary cavalry duty.
From Donovan's research, Custer didn't seem to understand that his regiment was asking for the fate it got by going into the field so ill-trained, and he did nothing to improve its prospects. He and many other officers in the Army at that time were more interested in reclaiming their brevet (temporary) Civil War ranks rather than attending to their assigned duties, and the top command of the Army displayed serious incompetence in allowing such self-serving activities to occur at the expense of the Army's readiness. Such blindness, honed with superiority and arrogance, was a major factor in the defeat.
These observations of Custer can also apply to the other commands ordered to conquer the Lakota and their allies that summer. For instance, Gen. George Crook's command expended about 25,000 rounds (roughly ten per soldier present) at the Battle of the Rosebud -- only causing between 31 and 84 Lakota and Cheyenne casualties -- a sorry result which indicates the command neglect of not improving the Army's marksmanship. Donovan reports that this expenditure of almost all of the rounds carried by Crook's command was one major reason why Crook was not in position to support Custer's later assault.
Overall command was limply exercised by Gen. Alfred Terry, who allowed his three subordinates -- Custer, Crook, and Col. John Gibbon — far too much leeway for independent action in what needed to be a tightly coordinated plan. His successor, Nelson Miles, appears to have learned from Terry's mistakes, as he became the most-successful commander in the effort to pacify the Native Americans after Terry was reassigned to department command.
Article comments
1 - Victor Lana
Sounds like an excellent way to revisit such a historic moment. I am especially interested in the Native American perspective of that day. Thanks for letting us know about this book.
2 - Richard Tilford
Dear Mr. Donovan
As i tried to explain to other historians
that my great grand father J.G. Tilford lead senior major and other officers of the
upper command did not approve of custers methods. Look up the history on my relative on google Richard Tilford
3 - Lew
I'm not sure this review begins to give fair credit to the work done by Donovan. Like some others, I've become engrossed in the Battle of the Little Big Horn and have read extensively about it. Donovan does NOT explain the Indian perspective as well as others did, but his wealth of details is far superior to any other source I've found. For example, Donovan does not explain how many Indians turned Custer back when he tried to cross the river and attack the women and children (a favorite military tactic--kill Indian women and children to get Indian warriors to back off). Other sources state there were only 6 Indians -- and then name them. 6 Indians. On the other hand, no other source so clearly explains Benteen's lack of support and why Reno and Benteen just sat there while their boot mates were killed in overwhelming combat. Donovan's work is the best I have seen and will conclude my search.