Book Review: A Terrible Glory - Custer and the Little Bighorn by James Donovan

There are advantages to having relatives working in the publishing trade. I often get to read the proof galleys of books before they get published, which is how I came into possession of A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn by James Donovan, which is to be released by Little, Brown & Co. in March of 2008.

Donovan's research covers the entire period of the Indian wars, including conflicts involving tribes far from the Great Plains involving military officers who participated in the campaign which cost George Armstrong Custer his life, but the main focus of the book once this background is established is the Battle of the Little Bighorn.

Like many Americans, I have read about Custer's Last Stand many times since I first saw Errol Flynn in They Died With Their Boots On. Considering that ongoing interest, one has to marvel at how it is possible at such a late date to have anything new to say about that debacle, and yet author James Donovan managed to accomplish that very deed.

Donovan culled historical fact from well-known and obscure sources, with source material dates ranging as far back as 1863 to as recently as 2007. Donovan also doesn't exclude information from Native witnesses either, which provide a perspective too often ignored in telling the tale of the Seventh Cavalry at the Little Bighorn. Many of the books he cites were published privately, so one must assume that tracking down surviving volumes had to have taken a great deal of time. In addition, many collections of letters and contemporary newspaper accounts were also used, sometimes to great effect, to illuminate the atmosphere at certain times, such as the investigative hearings into the conduct of Major Marcus Reno on June 25, 1876.

These sources were instrumental in forming a view of just how unprepared the Seventh Cavalry was for the chore assigned to them. Many of the troopers were newly inducted, barely trained, and some didn't speak English well. Many had never even fired a weapon in anger in their lives, or knew how to care for a horse much less ride one. A crash course in the absolute basics of cavalry operations was undertaken by a few of the more diligent officers just prior to the Seventh departing on the campaign, but this was the exception to the norm.

Donovan's research points out to the discerning that Custer's share of the blame, besides the well-known historical charges of rashness and impulsiveness, included not knowing the sorry readiness state of his command. He was on poor terms with most of his officers, and wasn't aware of their personal capabilities and deficiencies. In addition, most of the regiment's regular officers -- who should have known the condition and readiness of the Seventh -- were on detached duty elsewhere, so company command devolved in their absence onto the lower and less experienced officers. So many officers were unavailable for command that, in one case, an officer was borrowed from an infantry unit for temporary cavalry duty.

From Donovan's research, Custer didn't seem to understand that his regiment was asking for the fate it got by going into the field so ill-trained, and he did nothing to improve its prospects. He and many other officers in the Army at that time were more interested in reclaiming their brevet (temporary) Civil War ranks rather than attending to their assigned duties, and the top command of the Army displayed serious incompetence in allowing such self-serving activities to occur at the expense of the Army's readiness. Such blindness, honed with superiority and arrogance, was a major factor in the defeat.

Article Author: Realist

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