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<title>Blogcritics Author: Mike Valdman</title>
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<copyright>Copyright 2005-2007 by the authors</copyright>
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<title>Announcement: Short-content feeds</title>
<link>http://blogcritics.org/</link>
<author>Phillip Winn</author><description>Sunday, August 26, 2007, marks the switch of all Blogcritics.org article feeds from full-content to short-content. This is the result of several converging factors, and is unfortunately a permanent decision (as permanent as any decision can be on the web, that is). We are aware of all of the reasons that this is a Bad Idea, and we are aware that some of you will be quite upset about having to click on something to read the free content, and we&#039;re sorry. Unfortunately, despite great effort, full-content feeds are not currently economically viable.

Two other factors are involved: full-content feeds have resulted in an unprecedented level of content theft, with BC content appearing on many websites, usually spam sites, without attribution or permission. This duplicate content causes a cascading set of problems, not the least of which is that search engines generally aren&#039;t favorable to duplicate content, and don&#039;t always guess correctly. Finally, our RSS advertising partner is strongly in favor of short-content feeds.

We hope that you&#039;ll continue to subscribe to BC via RSS, and when an article grabs your eye, it&#039;s only a click away, still free on the BC website. Thank you for your understanding.</description>
<category>Administration</category><guid isPermaLink="false">0@blogcritics.org</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 26 Aug 2007 12:00:00 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Abortion and a Father&#039;s Right to Choose</title>
<link>http://blogcritics.org/archives/2005/12/07/143915.php</link>
<author>Mike Valdman</author><description>Many who are staunchly pro-choice about abortion also support holding fathers accountable for their children.  That is, they believe that fathers should be legally obligated to provide for their children even if they didn&#039;t want children.  The law agrees, holding fathers financially responsible for their offspring regardless of their interest in having children.  For the sake of clarity, I will refer to such men as &quot;unwilling fathers&quot;.  Is it fair, however, for pro-choice advocates to hold unwilling fathers responsible for their children?  I will argue that it isn&#039;t.    To see why, notice that, on the one hand, pro-choice advocates argue that the fetus has NO right to its mother&#039;s body unless its mother CHOOSES to give it this right.  On the other hand, they argue that a fetus has FULL rights to its father&#039;s wallet REGARDLESS of whether the father chooses to give it this right.  On this view, a fetus has rights over its unwilling father but not its unwilling mother.  This is especially peculiar because, according to pro-choice advocates, the decision to abort is entirely the mother&#039;s.  In other words, on the standard pro-choice view, a fetus has full rights over its father, who has no control over the fetus&#039;s destiny, and NO rights over its mother, who has complete control over the fetus&#039;s destiny.  On the standard pro-choice view, the father has no rights and no power but much of the responsibility.  This is puzzling because we typically think that individuals are responsible for what&#039;s within their control and not for events beyond their control - but not according to the standard pro-choice view.       One might argue that the father is obligated to his child because he had sex in full knowledge of the possible consequences.  But this argument is not available to a pro-choice advocate because, after all, the mother too had sex in full knowledge of the possible consequences (in most cases).  If the father should be held responsible because he knowingly took a risk, then the same goes for the mother.  And since a pro-choice advocate will not accept the latter, she cannot argue that an unwilling father should be forced to pay child support because he knowingly took a risk.  Perhaps there&#039;s some other reason why unwilling fathers ought to be held accountable for their children that&#039;s compatible with the pro-choice view, but I&#039;ll leave it to the reader to figure out what that reason may be.  If holding unwilling fathers responsible for their children is incompatible with the pro-choice view, then I suggest that the only intellectually honest resolution is to extend a right of choice to the father.  Specifically, a pro-choice advocate should allow fathers to choose, prior to birth, their degree of involvement with the fetus.  On this view, the fetus would have no automatic right to its father&#039;s wallet unless the father gives the fetus this right.  Similarly, the fetus would have no right to use its mother&#039;s body unless the mother chose to give it this right.  Presumably, some legal mechanism could be devised to implement this proposal.  I should point out that, like the mother, the father would have to make up his mind prior to birth.  If no one demurred prior to birth, then, once born, both parents would be equally obligated to the fetus, and the infant would have a right to his father&#039;s resources.     
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<category>Politics</category><guid isPermaLink="false">40652@blogcritics.org</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 7 Dec 2005 14:39:15 EST</pubDate>
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<title>Should the Government Subsidize Wal-Mart Employees?</title>
<link>http://blogcritics.org/archives/2005/12/05/163757.php</link>
<author>Mike Valdman</author><description>When it comes to paying its floor workers, Wal-Mart is one stingy company.  It is so stingy that that the government often is forced to subsidize its employee&#039;s health and housing costs.  Here is how one author summarizes a recent congressional report examining this issue:&quot;For a 200-employee Wal-Mart store, the government is spending $108,000 a year for children&#039;s health care; $125,000 a year in tax credits and deductions for low-income families; and $42,000 a year in housing assistance. The report estimates that a 200-employee Wal-Mart store costs federal taxpayers $420,000 a year, or about $2,103 per Wal-Mart employee. That translates into a total annual welfare bill of $2.5 billion for Wal-Mart&#039;s 1.2 million US employees.&quot;These facts are often taken as a damning indictment of Wal-Mart&#039;s labor practices, but are they?  I will argue that they are not, and that, even if accurate, these facts give liberals no reason to dislike Wal-Mart.  There may be other reasons to dislike Wal-Mart, but I don&#039;t address them in this article.   To see why these facts are not damning, travel back with me to the mid-1990s when welfare reform was all the rage.  Back then, an often noted problem with welfare was that it discouraged work.  If a welfare recipient found work, their benefits would be cut by about 70 cents for every dollar they earned, so getting a minimum wage job didn&#039;t &quot;pay.&quot;  In response, many liberals argued that welfare benefits should not be cut if the recipient found work - or at least not cut as sharply.  In short, many liberals found nothing wrong with the idea that the government should subsidize low-wage labor.  Indeed, in 1993, Bill Clinton embraced this idea by expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit, which can raise the annual income of a low-wage worker with children by as much as 40 percent.  Liberals favor this program, believing that the state should subsidize low-wage workers.Return now to the statistics about how much the government spends on a typical Wal-Mart employee.  All they show is that taxpayers are subsidizing Wal-Mart&#039;s low-wage workers.  But this is not something that liberals generally oppose.  
Liberals think that the government has good reason to subsidize low-wage labor.  They think that the government should pay the health-care costs of the poor, and other costs like housing and job training.  So why vilify Wal-Mart on these grounds?  The answer must lie in the idea that the burden of providing health care should fall on employers and not on the government.  But why should it?  Notice that this is an especially odd argument for a liberal to make since liberals tend to think that the government has an obligation to provide universal health care.  Perhaps the thought is that Wal-Mart in particular ought to increase its wages because its wages are low relative to other companies in the industry (say, Costco).  But Wal-Mart&#039;s low wages are reflected in its extremely low prices, which benefit the working poor.  An increase in wages would lead to an increase in prices, which would hurt the millions of people who save a lot of money by shopping at Wal-Mart. What really bothers people about Wal-Mart, I think, is not that the government subsidizes some of its workers, but that if Wal-Mart increased its prices ever so slightly (even five cents an item), the price increase would be virtually imperceptible to customers, but Wal-Mart could then afford to pay its employees decent wages.  But even a small increase in its prices would make Wal-Mart susceptible to more ruthless competitors.  After all, Wal-Mart operates in an extremely competitive market environment.  It would be unfair to force Wal-Mart, and only Wal-Mart, to raise its prices.  A fairer solution would be to force everyone to raise prices ever so slightly and use the proceeds to help make work pay.  That, however, is a government subsidy.  It is a tax.  It is precisely what liberals have always defended.  They have always supported government efforts to subsidize low-wage labor.  A tax, say, on corporate profits to be used to help the working poor would be fair and honest.  Why they want to single out Wal-Mart, however, is beyond me.  </description>
<category>Politics</category><guid isPermaLink="false">40537@blogcritics.org</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 5 Dec 2005 16:37:57 EST</pubDate>
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<title>Alito should be rejected BECAUSE he will literally interpret our Constitution</title>
<link>http://blogcritics.org/archives/2005/11/08/190033.php</link>
<author>Mike Valdman</author><description>Should you support Judge Alito&#039;s nomination to the Supreme Court?  Your answer should turn on one question: How much do you respect the U.S. Constitution?  If you answer &quot;a lot&quot;, then, Conservative or Liberal, Alito is your man.  If you answer &quot;a bit&quot;, then call your senator and demand someone else.Let me explain.  By all accounts, Alito is an extremely smart and capable judge.  More importantly, he has a deep reverence for the constitution.  Indeed, his reverence runs so deep that he interprets it as literally as possible - as if it were holy scripture.  Alito subscribes to a doctrine known as Originalism, which is the view that the constitution should be interpreted according to how its sentences would have been understood at the time they were written.   This means that, if confirmed, Alito will skillfully interpret the constitution very literally.  Thus, if you have a high opinion of the constitution, then Alito is the clear choice regardless of your political affiliation.  If, however, you think that the constitution is a deeply flawed document (as I do), then a literal interpretation is the last thing you want.  Instead, you want smart, capable, and, most importantly, result-oriented judges.  That is, you want a judge who will consider the consequences of his ruling, and not just whether his ruling is legally sound according to the letter of the constitution.  In short, you want the very opposite of an Originalist.  In fact, I think all of us should be clamoring for a non-Originalist not because there is something wrong with Originalism but because there&#039;s something wrong with the constitution.  A number of commentators have pointed out just how dramatically our society would change if the Originalists had their way.  Cass Sunstein, for instance, argues that if you interpret the constitution literally, there could no meaningful gun control laws, states can declare official religions, national laws protecting labor, such as laws against child labor, union protections, minimum wage, and mandatory overtime would be unconstitutional.  Enviromental laws would vanish.  All of the anti-segregation laws, including the 1964 civil rights act - would be null and void since they are based on a non-literal interpretation of the constitution&#039;s interstate commerce clause (as are many other laws).  Our right to privacy would disappear.  And that&#039;s just the tip of the iceberg.  Typically, however, these commentators conclude that the problem lies in Originalism.  But that&#039;s plainly false.  Originalism would be entirely sensible if one were interpreting a sensible document.  The problem, then, lies not in Originalism but in the constitution itself.  If the constitution were a more sensible document, Originalism would be hailed as the only reasonable judicial philosophy.  In an ideal society, then, we would update the constitution to reflect modern reality.  In particular, we would give congress much more power than a literal reading of the constitution gives it (to clarify: I&#039;m not saying that congress should have more power than it actually has but that it should have more power than a literal reading of the constitution gives it).  But since we&#039;re not going to do this anytime soon, we ought to support a non-Originalist judge.  We need such a judge to save us from our Constitution.   
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<category>Politics</category><guid isPermaLink="false">39229@blogcritics.org</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 8 Nov 2005 19:00:33 EST</pubDate>
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<title>Should We Embrace a Culture of Life?</title>
<link>http://blogcritics.org/archives/2005/11/04/130255.php</link>
<author>Mike Valdman</author><description>It&#039;s easy to poke fun at the seeming inconsistencies of those who purport to defend &quot;The Culture of Life&quot;. Intensely passionate about life at the margins, they are relatively indifferent to life between the margins.  They&#039;ll march for the fetus, the embryo, and for those in a persistent vegetative state, but they&#039;ll barely lift a finger for a sick child without health insurance.  It&#039;s as if they lose interest in the child the second she is born and don&#039;t regain an interest unless she winds up in a permanent coma.  Clearly, this is a peculiar point of view.        But it is not necessarily inconsistent. Defenders of the culture of life will tell you that they are guided by one simple principle: all human life is equally valuable. Or, more precisely, that all innocent human life is equally valuable. This principle puts embryos and human vegetables morally on a par with normal children and adults. On this view, killing embryos is just as wrong as killing children.One can object to this view in at least three ways:  
(1) deny that embryos, fetuses, and human vegetables are human.
(2) argue that embracing universal human equality commits one to fight for universal health care just as vigorously as it commits one to oppose abortion.
(3) reject the inherent equality of all innocent human lives.(1) is pointless because embryos, fetuses, and human vegetables are obviously human. (2) is worth exploring but I&#039;m going to defend (3). I think it&#039;s demonstrably false that all innocent human life is equally valuable. To see this, consider a simple thought experiment. Suppose that you had the power to determine whether the next 100 fetuses to be born would be born normal or seriously deformed. Suppose that, if you push button A, they&#039;ll all be born normal and healthy. If you push button B, they&#039;ll all be born permanently brain damaged and paralyzed. Now, if you genuinely believe that all innocent human life is equally valuable, then you should be indifferent between pushing A or B --  you should flip a coin. But no sane person could be indifferent in this situation. It would be monstrous to flip a coin. Anyone who would seriously consider pushing B is so gripped by a dogma that he&#039;s beyond the reach of rational argument.Clearly, the right thing to do is to push A, and that reveals the absurdity of believing that all human life is equally valuable. And without that principle, the Culture of Life doesn&#039;t have a leg to stand on.</description>
<category>Politics</category><guid isPermaLink="false">39041@blogcritics.org</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 4 Nov 2005 13:02:55 EST</pubDate>
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<title>Why We Should Withdraw From Iraq</title>
<link>http://blogcritics.org/archives/2005/10/25/072814.php</link>
<author>Mike Valdman</author><description>Very grudgingly and with much hesitation and hand wringing, I have come to the conclusion that we should start withdrawing our forces from Iraq.  The insurgency is growing in strength and sophistication.  U.S. operations to capture and isolate insurgents appear ineffective.  We can temporarily secure a city, but the insurgents return as soon as our forces withdraw.  Our presence only fuels the insurgency and delays the inevitable clash between the Sunni, Shia, and the Kurds.  Frankly, I just don&#039;t see what good maintaining a large military presence in Iraq can do.  Those who reject withdrawal typically cite the human tragedy that would likely follow our departure.  They claim that our forces are the only thing keeping Iraq from civil war.  I sympathize with this view but I think it overlooks the fact that, to some extent, Iraq is already in civil war.  Nearly every day there is an attack by the Sunni on the Shia or on our forces.  More importantly, there are irreconcilable differences between Iraq&#039;s main groups.  The Kurds seek autonomy, the Shia seek a united Iraq governed by clerics, the Sunni seek a return to power.  These goals, which none of these groups is ready to relinquish, are jointly untenable.  We can use our military power to force Iraq&#039;s groups to downplay their ambitions, but this is no long term solution.     I agree that IF we could turn Iraq into a thriving democracy, then we should stay until the job is done even if many U.S. lives are lost in the process.  But it&#039;s no longer reasonable to believe that we can turn Iraq into a thriving democracy, or a thriving anything, for that matter.  A segment of the population will always resist us no matter our benevolence (which is somewhat questionable anyhow), and that segment is growing both in number and strength.  Add to that the deep mistrust that Iraq&#039;s groups have for us and for each other, and you have a situation that cannot be stabilized any time soon.    As I said, I don&#039;t express this view with much confidence.  If I were the one making the decision, I&#039;d be a nervous wreck.  But, from my position of powerlessness, weighing all of the arguments, it seems to me that the stronger case is for withdrawal.  But I can see being convinced otherwise.   Ed/Pub:LisaM</description>
<category>Politics</category><guid isPermaLink="false">38453@blogcritics.org</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2005 07:28:14 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Why Didn&#039;t the Bush Administration just Plant the WMDs in Iraq?</title>
<link>http://blogcritics.org/archives/2005/10/19/160740.php</link>
<author>Mike Valdman</author><description>A standard Leftist view is that there is no limit to the Bush Administration&#039;s duplicity - there is no argument too spurious, no smear too shameful, and no lie too brazen to be used.  On the Leftist view, this Administration is interested in winning elections and implementing its agenda at any cost - no matter how immoral; the ends always justify the means.  There is lots of evidence to support this view (or perhaps a slightly less caustic version of this view).  There is, however, at least one piece of evidence that casts doubt on it - that the Administration, upon seeing that there were no WMDs in Iraq, didn&#039;t just go ahead and plant them.  If the Bush Administration is as duplicitous as its critics maintain, why didn&#039;t they just plant the weapons?  Here are some possible explanations:(1) They didn&#039;t think they could get away with it.  Convincingly planting WMDs in Iraq would have required the cooperation and silence of too many people.  This might be right, but I&#039;m not convinced.  Planting nuclear weapons would have been extremely difficult and risky, but planting biological weapons seems feasible.  Recall Colin Powell&#039;s infamous UN speech where he held up a vial of anthrax and claimed that just a few drops could kill thousands.  Vials of anthrax and other biological agents could have been smuggled into Iraq in suitcases.  Now, it may be possible to trace the origin of these biological agents, but presumably they could have been manufactured to be untraceable.  Perhaps, however, doing this would require the participation of too many people, which is always risky for a conspiracy.  (2) The Bush Administration isn&#039;t that duplicitous.  The perception on the Left that they are is simply irrational Bush hatred.  Well, maybe, but there&#039;s just too much evidence to the contrary.  I&#039;m sure you&#039;ve heard it all before, but if you just look at how they run campaigns, how they manage elections, how they&#039;ve politicized every government agency, how misleading their economic proposals are, how they smear any insider who dares raise his voice, how they deceived us into war, etc., it&#039;s hard to believe that this Administration is too pure of heart for such a conspiracy.  (3) They genuinely believed that WMDs would be found in Iraq, so they thought there was no need to plant them, and by the time they learned that there were no WMDs in Iraq, it was too late to plant them without arousing suspicion.  This seems to me to be the most plausible explanation, but it&#039;s in some ways the most disturbing.  This explanation assumes that the Bush Administration fell for its own WMD propaganda.  It&#039;s more comforting to believe that, deep in their hearts, they knew that they were peddling nonsense.  But perhaps their nonsense was good enough to fool even them.  And by the time they penetrated the fog of their own bullshit, it was too late to plant the weapons.  
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<category>Politics</category><guid isPermaLink="false">38182@blogcritics.org</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 19 Oct 2005 16:07:40 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Should We Support A Government Of Laws?</title>
<link>http://blogcritics.org/archives/2005/10/17/125640.php</link>
<author>Mike Valdman</author><description>Is having a government of laws desirable?  In the U.S. we seem to think so.  But there are serious disadvantages to having a government of laws, and these are rarely discussed. Of course, there are also many disadvantages to having a government of men, but these are well known. So what&#039;s wrong with a government of laws? First, anyone who&#039;s had to deal with a large bureaucracy knows all too well the disadvantages of a government of laws. Bureaucracies are inefficient and frustrating precisely because they are law-governed rather than people-governed. Someone above the law could cut through the red tape to deliver goods and services where they were needed.  Someone governed by law, however, has to carry out the law&#039;s dictates, even when doing so is wasteful, tedious, and unnecessary. In a fully law-governed society, as in a law-governed bureaucracy, there is no room for individual discretion and judgment. Sometimes this a good thing, but sometimes it isn&#039;t.Second, a government of laws is often forced to make decisions on the basis of irrelevant factors. Consider, for instance, the recent Supreme Court decision on medicinal marijuana. Ideally, the Court would have weighed the science, the practical considerations, and the moral arguments to deliver a thoughtful verdict. What happened, however, was far more typical -- the judgment turned on a legal technicality that had nothing to do with the science or morality of smoking pot.  The entire case turned on whether there was a rational basis for concluding that legalizing medicinal marijuana would substantially affect interstate commerce.  Indeed, many Supreme Court decisions have been based on the interstate commerce clause even when this has virtually no connection to the issue (e.g. anti-segregation laws).   Whatever your view on medicinal marijuana, it&#039;s hard to believe that this &quot;rational basis test&quot; was the best way to settle the issue.  But this is what happens when the law is sovereign.  Consider another example. In the U.S., it is extremely difficult to talk sensibly about gun control since the discussion will inevitably degenerate into a debate about the second amendment. Yet the second amendment has nothing to teach us about sensible gun policy.  The second amendment can tell us only where the law stands - it cannot tell us what is right. That so many people confuse legality and rightness shows just how gripped we are by the idea of a government of laws.  Of course, there&#039;s plenty to be said against a government of men. But that shouldn&#039;t stop us from seeing the disadvantages of letting the law reign supreme.Ed:Pub/LisaM</description>
<category>Politics</category><guid isPermaLink="false">38022@blogcritics.org</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 17 Oct 2005 12:56:40 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Iraqi and American Founding Fathers</title>
<link>http://blogcritics.org/archives/2005/10/16/082055.php</link>
<author>Mike Valdman</author><description>In the U.S. we revere our founding fathers. In many circles, if a policy can be shown to be to be incompatible with our their intentions, this is considered a decisive objection against it.   This reverence is also revealed in the demand for strict constructionism - judges who refuse to deviate from the letter of the constitution.  The virtues of this view are often deemed self-evident.      But the current situation in Iraq should give us some pause. (It won&#039;t, but it should.) If the Iraqis are able to ratify a constitution, and if Iraq should become stable, then at some point in the distant future Iraqis may also appeal to the intentions of their founding fathers in settling their disputes - the very men who are currently hammering out a compromise. Two hundred years from now, it&#039;s entirely possible that political matters in Iraq will be settled by considering the intentions of the current Iraqi negotiators and representatives.  In 2205 some Iraqi might go on national television and defend his political views on the grounds that it is what Ahmad Chalabi intended, and be taken seriously.  Books may even be written trying to decipher Chalabi&#039;s intentions from his parliamentary speeches - books that are taken to have deep political relevance.   That is absurd. And if it&#039;s absurd for them, it&#039;s absurd for us.Why is it absurd? Well, for one, it&#039;s hard to believe that whatever framework the Iraqis agree to (if they agree at all) will have any relevance for Iraq in 2205. Second, the current Iraqi negotiators are a diverse lot. Their motivations range from the noble and altruistic to  the ignoble and selfish. Our founding fathers were just like that. They were not saints or Gods. Like the current Iraqi negotiators, they were people with sectarian concerns who were trying to get as much as possible while giving away as little as possible.  Thus there is no reason to regard their deliberations as a decisive guide to all future policy decisions.The political struggle over Iraq&#039;s constitution should persuade us to lower the esteem in which we hold our own founding fathers. At the very least, it should make us less reliant on their intentions for determining future policies, and it should make us question the importance of strict constructionism.  But so far it hasn&#039;t done any of these things.  
ed/Pub:NB
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<category>Politics</category><guid isPermaLink="false">37954@blogcritics.org</guid>
<pubDate>Sun, 16 Oct 2005 08:20:55 EDT</pubDate>
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<title>Why Is The Right Opposed To Harriet Miers?</title>
<link>http://blogcritics.org/archives/2005/10/10/192900.php</link>
<author>Mike Valdman</author><description>In Bush&#039;s five years as president he hasn&#039;t received any serious opposition from his own party.  Sure, there&#039;s been occasional grumbling even from his base, but his nomination of Harriet Miers marks the first time that conservative criticism has been this passionate and sustained.  But why is the Right so opposed to her?  Here are some possible explanations:(1) The Right is desperate to appoint a justice who is clearly committed to overturning Roe v. Wade, and there&#039;s nothing in Miers&#039; record to suggest that she fits the bill.  The problem with this explanation is that the Right was thoroughly unopposed to John Roberts, whose past is equally opaque.  If the Right is so desperate for an unequivocally pro-life justice, where was the opposition to Roberts?(2) Miers is not one of America&#039;s &quot;leading legal lights&quot;.  She may be a fine lawyer but she has no credentials as a legal scholar.  According to this explanation, the Right&#039;s main priority is to appoint a brilliant legal mind, and, by most accounts, Miers fails this test.  If this were true, it would explain their support of Roberts and their opposition to Miers.  In my less cynical moments I&#039;m tempted by this explanation, but this can&#039;t be the full story.  Surely what the Right most wants is a very conservative judge regardless of his  or her legal competence.  Indeed, the Right loves Clarence Thomas, who nobody would describe as a brilliant legal mind, precisely because they like how he votes.    (3) Opposition to Miers is really opposition to Bush.  Bush keeps asking conservatives to &quot;trust&quot; him.  Until now, he has had their unflinching trust.  But perhaps recent scandals and disasters are shaking the Right&#039;s faith in Bush.  If this is true, it marks a major turning point in his presidency.  But is it true?  I haven&#039;t seen any evidence aside from the controversy over Miers to suggest that it is.  So I&#039;m withholding judgment until I see conservative opposition to Bush elsewhere.    (4) The Right dislikes both Miers and Roberts, but they couldn&#039;t non-hypocritically oppose Roberts.    The idea here is that the Right desperately wants someone with an established conservative record, but they cannot oppose a nominee solely on the grounds that he lacks this record.  Why not?  Well, the Right is always talking about having no political litmus tests on nominees, and if they oppose a nominee for not having a conservative track record, this would be employing a political litmus test.  So, they must find other grounds for rejecting a nominee, such as a lack of legal brilliance.  They couldn&#039;t play this card with Roberts, but they could with Miers.  So, on this explanation, the Right cares not a whit about legal brilliance (note again Clarence Thomas) - they care only about conservative justices, but their own rhetoric and talking points prevent them from opposing a judge on the grounds that he isn&#039;t conservative enough. This strikes me as the most plausible explanation of their opposition to Miers.   Ed/Pub:LisaM   </description>
<category>Politics</category><guid isPermaLink="false">37715@blogcritics.org</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 10 Oct 2005 19:29:00 EDT</pubDate>
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