Blogcritics Author: David Barbour

Announcement: Short-content feeds

Phillip Winn — Sun, 26 Aug 2007 12:00:00 EDT

Sunday, August 26, 2007, marks the switch of all Blogcritics.org article feeds from full-content to short-content. This is the result of several converging factors, and is unfortunately a permanent decision (as permanent as any decision can be on the web, that is). We are aware of all of the reasons that this is a Bad Idea, and we are aware that some of you will be quite upset about having to click on something to read the free content, and we're sorry. Unfortunately, despite great effort, full-content feeds are not currently economically viable. Two other factors are involved: full-content feeds have resulted in an unprecedented level of content theft, with BC content appearing on many websites, usually spam sites, without attribution or permission. This duplicate content causes a cascading set of problems, not the least of which is that search engines generally aren't favorable to duplicate content, and don't always guess correctly. Finally, our RSS advertising partner is strongly in favor of short-content feeds. We hope that you'll continue to subscribe to BC via RSS, and when an article grabs your eye, it's only a click away, still free on the BC website. Thank you for your understanding.

2004 Men's National Team vs. 2006 Men's National Team

David Barbour — Thu, 17 Aug 2006 01:23:05 EDT

By now, it is pretty obvious that the 2006 version of USA Men's Basketball is much better than the team fielded in 2004, but just how much better is worth looking at. Each team played five exhibition games leading up to their respective tournaments so those are the games I compared. It remains to be seen how USA will do in the World Championships, but the outlook looks bright for the sort of success that has eluded the national teams for the last few years.In 2004, the national team played two great games, one horrific game, and two not-quite-good games. They destroyed Puerto Rico and Serbia-Montenegro, outscoring those two teams by 15.9 points per 100 possessions and 14.9 points per 100 possessions, respectively. Italy outscored the US 33.3 points per 100 possessions, a dominating performance in every sense of the word. To be outdone in offensive efficiency by such a margin as this is reason enough to forfeit your spot in any world tournament, but the US kept playing. Overall, the US put up an offensive efficiency of 106.3 points per 100 possessions in their five exhibition games. They allowed their opponents 104.7 points per 100 possessions. That slight advantage for the US speaks of a slightly above .500 team, which is the sort of team they ended up being in the Olympics, going 5-3 (note: I have the advantage of writing this in hindsight, but the numbers did give an indication of what their future performance would be if they stayed the course they were on).By contrast, the 2006 version has run roughshod over all five teams who were foolish enough to step on the same court. Even in their worst game, when they only beat Brazil by four points, they still had an offensive advantage of 11.9 points per 100 possessions. For the five games, the team has put up 128.0 points per 100 possessions while giving up only 89.3 points per 100 possessions. It doesn't get any better than that. However, the difference between the two teams does not stop at how efficiently they play on both ends. The 2006 team is also better at taking care of the basketball; they have averaged .168 turnovers per possession while the 2004 squad turned the ball over .222 times per possession. Also, USA men's basketball version 2006 has a higher offensive rebounding percentage (.351 to .260) and they have a much higher effective field goal percentage (.613 to .568), on the strength of making more than twice as many 3's as the 2004 bricklayers. Those advantages for the 2006 team extend to the defensive side of the ball as well. To shorten things up a bit, here is where the 2006 team is better: creating more turnovers, getting a higher percentage of defensive rebounds, allowing a lower effective field goal percentage, and also a lower floor percentage. Floor percentage is the percentage of a team's possessions where they score at least one point and is a Dean Oliver statistic.One major difference between the two teams besides the 2006 team clearly being superior is the pace at which they play the game. Because the international games are only forty minutes long, I had to extend the number of team possessions to how many they would have had if they continued their pace and played in an average NBA length game (242 minutes for both 2004 and 2006). After I did the adjustment to their pace, the 2004 team played at a pace factor of 87.8. The average 2004 NBA team had a pace factor 90.1. Now, Larry Brown is notorious for playing at a deliberate pace, but when you have what are supposedly some of your country's best players, your team should play faster than the average NBA team. If the team does not, the players' potential cannot be maximized. Coach K has taken a vastly different approach and what looks to be the right one. Under him, the 2006 version has a pace factor of 100.9 when the average 2006 NBA team played with a pace factor of 90.6. That is how an All-Star squad should be used.Not only has the 2006 squad played infinitely better, but they have also been coached infinitely better.I used the term All-Star squad loosely, but All-Star teams play at a frenetic pace during All-Star games. The winners of the 2004 and 2006 All-Star Game had pace factors of 120.3 and 118.4, respectively. Perhaps I should have used the term controlled All-Star squad.

David Barbour wastes his time by following sports and wastes your time by writing about them. He hopes evidence is uncovered that Babe Ruth took steroids so the love affair with him will cease and desist.

Isiah Thomas Could Be A Better Coach Than You Think

David Barbour — Tue, 11 Jul 2006 20:11:36 EDT

This article is a little old, being written six days ago, but it is still worth writing about and adding a few details to it that the author Dave D'Alessandro left out. In the article, D'Alessandro makes the claim that Isiah Thomas the coach will save Isiah Thomas the GM, which is probably right. The Knicks certainly won't get any worse, so there is a high probability James Dolan will not fire Thomas right away. Actually, just by virtue of the team suiting up for all 82 games next year, the Knicks can be expected to improve their winning percentage by 9% which would give them 30 wins next season. That will be the summer focus in New York, which is to basketball what Islamic fundamentalism is to Iran.I highly doubt it. Highly. Plus your analogy is backwards if you want it to make sense. If you don't, then it makes perfect sense. As an executive, Isiah Thomas is a human pratfall. But coaching always has been his passion, and when you take an objective look at his track record in Indiana, he is good at it.Following D'Alessandro's advice, I took an objective look at Isiah Thomas's coaching career. When he took over the helm of the Indiana Pacers in 2001, he was taking over a franchise who had gone to the NBA Finals the previous year. Not only had the Pacers done that, but they also led the NBA in offensive efficiency. In Thomas's first year, there was a huge drop-off in offensive efficiency going from 108.6 in 2000 to 103.0 in 2001, which was good for 13th out of 29 teams. The Pacers finished with a 41-41 record. So Isiah did a horrible job, right? Not so fast.The roster stability for the 2001 Indiana Pacers was only .75. What this means is 75% of the minutes in each season were played by the same players. This is the equivalent of losing 1 1/2 positions, not at all an insignificant ordeal to face. Still, he managed to take the Pacers back to the playoffs, where they bowed out to the Philadelphia 76ers who went on to the NBA Finals.In 2002, the roster stability for the Pacers was even lower than it had been in 2001, coming in at .73. Despite that, Thomas led the Pacers to the playoffs, losing again in the first round. That time it was the New Jersey Nets who ended the Pacers' season. Like the 76ers, the Nets went on to the NBA Finals.The year 2003 was a different beast altogether for Isiah Thomas and the Indiana Pacers. With a roster stability of .92, they basically had the same roster in 2003 that they had in 2002. As expected, the Pacers rewarded Thomas with posting a high in offensive efficency and a low in defensive efficiency over the three years of Thomas's coaching tenure. They also had a 48-34 record, again a high for an Isiah Thomas-led Pacers team. Based on point differential, the Pacers should have been 51-31, which could be used as a mark against Thomas, but could also be chalked up to bad luck.However, the season for the Pacers ended in disappointing fashion because they lost again in the first round of the playoffs. What made this first round loss different than the others is they lost to an inferior team in the Boston Celtics. Thomas could have squeezed out more improvement from the Pacers had they had maintained a high level of roster stability for another year, but Thomas was fired by Larry Bird after this season and replaced by Rick Carlisle.D'Alessandro continues: It's [leadership's] about imparting a vision (think Phoenix East), infusing some affinity, settling on a rotation and restoring the confidence Brown methodically shattered.If anyone wants to get a handle on how hard a roster this was for Larry Brown to coach, the roster stability for the 2006 Knicks was .39, the equivalent of losing three positions from the 2005 Knicks. I haven't looked at the other NBA teams' roster stabilities, but I am pretty sure the Knicks have the lowest stability in the league.Yes, Brown could have settled on a rotation, but this Knicks team was doomed from the start by all of Thomas's ill-conceived moves in the offseason and during the season.

How The MLB Might Look if Pythagoras Ran the Show

David Barbour — Wed, 21 Jun 2006 15:51:35 EDT

In baseball, like all other sports, consistency is the name of the game. While it may be exciting for fans to watch their favorite team explode for 14 runs after scoring 1, 2, and 3 runs in the previous three games, it would probably have been better for the team record-wise to score 5 fiveruns in each game.That being said, there have been a number of MLB teams so far this season that have an actual winning percentage which is a good deal better or worse than their Pythagorean winning percentage (a formula which calculates expected winning percentage based on runs scored and runs allowed). I chose to write about only a few of the more interesting teams in order to keep my effort level at a minimum.To get a handle on how consistent the teams I picked were doing, I looked at the variance (standard deviation squared) of the runs they have scored and the runs they have allowed. There are probably other statistics one can look at to explain the question at hand, but I chose variance and the results I found were interesting enough for me to write them up.AL EastNew York YankeesThe Yankees' actual winning percentage is only .018 lower than its Pythagorean winning percentage, but it is always fun to write about the Yankees, whether it is to praise them or to bash them.There does not seem to be a problem with the Yankees offense on the surface since they are averaging 5.8 runs per game, highest among the teams I looked at. Their ability to prevent runs is also fairly good as evidenced by the Yankees allowing an average of 4.8 runs per game. However, the Yankees offense has a variance of 13.6, which is second highest among the teams I looked at. This variance indicates that there are some games where the Yankees will explode for a large number of runs and other games where they can barely scrape together any runs. While the Yankees have a high margin for error since they average +1 run per game, if their offense had been more consistent, they would right now be leading the AL East instead of being two games back of the lead.The blame cannot be blamed on the team's defense because they have been relatively consistent with a variance of 9.4, a little lower variance than the average of the over-performing and under-performing teams.Boston Red SoxThe team who the Yankees are trailing in the race for the AL East division lead is the Boston Red Sox, whose actual winning percentage right now is .052 higher than their Pythagorean winning percentage.While Boston's average runs scored of 5.4 runs per game and average runs allowed of 4.9 runs per game are not better than the Yankees' averages, their consistency is much better.The Red Sox offense has a variance of 9.5 (9.1 before their 11-3 triumph over the Washington Nationals) and the defense variance of 9.0 go a long way in explaining why the Red Sox have won more games than the Yankees although their run differential is worse. With this level of consistency, the Red Sox have a higher chance of putting up run totals in games that approach their averages instead of being all over the board. That ability has certainly helped them so far.AL CentralCleveland IndiansIf you are a Cleveland Indians fan, then before you read this I suggest you take a shot of the hardest liquor you can find. In fact, you might be better off downing the whole bottle because of the 14 teams whose variance I calculated, the Indians had the highest variance for both runs scored and runs allowed and the second lowest differential between actual winning percentage and Pythagorean winning percentage (-.075).Whereas most teams may have been inconsistent in only one department, Cleveland put up a variance of 13.8 for runs scored and 14.9 for runs allowed. Therefore, spectators really have no idea which Indians team will show up. They may play brilliantly on offense and defense, play brilliantly on offense only, play brilliantly on defense only, or play poorly on both sides. While the same is true for all teams, at least with most other teams there is a trend for one side or the other. With the Indians, there is no trend except their penchant for being inconsistent.And their inconsistently certainly overrides their average run differential of +0.7 runs per game.AL WestOakland AthleticsRight now, the A's are in a spot where they should not be, tied for the lead atop the AL West. By all rights, based on their run differential, the A's winning percentage should be .507 and not the .535 it actually is.Even their average runs scored and runs allowed indicate the A's are closer to a .500 team (4.5 to 4.4). Their saving grace has been their consistency in scoring runs with a variance of 7.8 (highest among studied teams), surprisingly, since they have a reputation and a justified one at that for being a team with an anemic offense. Still, even if a team is only averaging 4.5 runs a game, the fact they can do so consistently always helps.While the ability to prevent runs has not been as consistent (variance of 9.7) as the offense, it has been consistent enough to not hurt the offense so far and bring the team down to its Pythagorean winning percentage.NL EastNew York MetsThe New York Mets look to be the strongest team in a National League while playing in a division with no real competition and they are also out-performing their Pythagorean winning percentage by .029.The way the Mets are out-performing their run differential may surprise those who have fallen in love with David Wright because they are doing it mostly based on the consistency of their ability to prevent runs (variance of 7.4). Their offense is not nearly as consistent with a variance of 10.8, but that is not looking like a problem for the Mets.Combine their extremely consistent run prevention with their already high margin for error (+1 run per game) and then it becomes very apparent how the Mets have been out-perfoming themselves.NL CentralSt. Louis CardinalsSt. Louis is another team that is out-performing their actual winning percentage, doing so by .049. They have done so largely by being supremely consistent in terms of both scoring runs and disallowing runs. Before the White Sox game last night where the Cardinals lost 20-6, they were the most overall consistent team of the 14 teams I studied with a variance of 8.3 for runs scored and 7.1 for runs allowed. After that game, their variance in runs allowed jumped up to 10.6 while their variance for runs scored stayed the same, but this is not to say they are not still very consistent when it comes to preventing runs.It will be interesting to see if the Cardinals can maintain their consistency in scoring runs when Pujols returns.Pittsburgh PiratesWith an actual winning percentage .095 lower than their Pythagorean winning percentage, the Pittsburgh Pirates have the lowest differential between those two winning percentages in all of MLB. A dubious honor, to say the least.Yet, the Pirates with a variance of 11.2 in runs scored and 8.9 in runs allowed are nowhere near as inconsistent as the Cleveland Indians and are even more consistent than the New York Yankees. So why are they so much lower than their teams in percentage differential?The answer lies in what it means to be inconsistent. Inconsistency brings a team closer to .500. For an above .500 team, like the Yankees, it means that the team will do worse than expected. For a below .500 team, like the Pirates, inconsistency makes a team do better than expected since the team is being drawn closer to .500. Therefore, the Pirates would probably benefit from being more inconsistent.NL WestLos Angeles DodgersThe Dodgers should not be a game behind the San Diego Padres in the NL West and yet they are, due to under-performing their Pythagorean winning percentage by .049. The reason for their underwhelming performance so far is a combination of things.With a variance of 9.8 in runs scored and 9.2 in runs allowed, the Dodgers are not greatly inconsistent in any one aspect, but they are also not consistent enough to override the fact they only have an average run differential of +0.6 runs per game. This low run differential leaves no room for any sort of inconsistency. So far, the Dodgers are coming to learn that.

Who Should Give Up Switch-Hitting?

David Barbour — Fri, 16 Jun 2006 20:37:24 EDT

In theory, switch hitting makes a player immune to the handedness of pitchers so a manager will get no distinct advantage out of bringing in a specialty reliever from the bullpen in an attempt to increase the percentages of the reliever recording an out. If a left-handed reliever comes into the game, then the hitter can bat from the right-handed batter's box or vice versa. The same holds true for switch hitters versus opposing starting pitchers. A left-handed switch hitter need not have been taken out of the lineup when facing vintage Randy Johnson. That being said, switch hitting is only effective when a hitter performs equally well or close to it from both sides of the plate.Understandably, there is an element of comfort involved in always looking at a right-handed pitcher from the same angle. But even comfort, at some point, is trumped by a large drop-off in production. And that threshold comes when there is a 10% or greater difference between the OPS in one batter's box versus what the OPS is in the other.After looking at the list of active switch hitters, I weeded out the ones who had not accumulated, since 2002 up to however many at-bats they have had this season, at least 500 at-bats as a right-handed better and 500 at-bats as a left-handed batter. When that was completed, I looked at their splits over the aforementioned time span and then took the percent difference between their higher OPS and their lower one. These are the hitters with whom switch hitting does not agree.Lance BerkmanAs LHB: .424 OBP/.592 SLG/1.016 OPS in 1,789 at-batsAs RHB: .392 OBP/.425 SLG/.818 OPS in 543 at-batsLance Berkman's inclusion on this late is certainly no indictment on his talent. His career line of .302 BA/.414 OBP/.560 SLG is impressive any way you look at it and he is one of the elite players in MLB right now. However, an interesting question to ask is how good those numbers would be if he did not consider himself a switch-hitter and stuck only to the left-handed batter's box. They probably would not be any worse.The most glaring difference between these two splits is with what little power Berkman hits with from the right side. His OBP is similar and so is his BA, but for a power hitter like Berkman to only slug .425 from the right side is embarrassing. The only thing more embarrassing is that he continues to bat right-handed when doing so makes him 80% of the hitter he is from the left side of the plate.Luis CastilloAs LHB: .369 OBP/.326 SLG/.694 OPS in 1,761 at-batsAs RHB: .389 OBP/.483 SLG/.872 OPS in 656 at-batsCastillo, like Berkman, has a 20% decrease in production, but unlike Berkman, Castillo hits better from the right side of the plate than he does from the left side. The problem is he is not a stellar hitter from either side. As a leadoff hitter, Castillo's main job is to get on base, which he does well from each side of the plate. In the right-handed batter's box, at least he couples that with a .483 SLG. One cannot say the same thing about his life as a lefty batter. It is not simple feat for a player to have a slugging percentage lower than his on-base percentage, but Castillo has found a way to do it. The Minnesota Twins would be well-advised to build an invisible dog electric fence around the lefty's batter's box, attach a collar around Castillo's neck, and shock him until he learns he is no longer allowed to bat left-handed.Brian RobertsAs LHB: .375 OBP/.437 SLG/.812 OPS in 1,369 at-batsAs RHB: .310 OBP/.350 SLG/.660 OPS in 586 at-batsBrian Roberts burst on the national scene last year when he posted splits of .459 OBP/.726 SLG/1.185 OPS, .440 OBP/.569 SLG/1.009 OPS, and .407 OBP/.534 SLG/.942 OPS over the first three months of the season. He cooled off during the course of the year, but still finished up the season with a very respectable line for a lead-off hitter of .387 OBP/.515 SLG/.903 OPS.Now he is notorious for another reason, namely being a poor switch hitter. With a 19% drop-off in OPS, there is really very little reason for him to continue hitting from the right side of the plate. Not only does Roberts' OPS suffer when he bats righty, but his batting average also takes a precipitous drop from .305 BA to .237, a decrease of .68 points. The fact that Roberts is just an average defensive second basemen makes the disparity between the sides of the plate even greater. A player whose offensive ability is his most important contribution to the team should not continue to hurt the team by batting so poorly when facing a particular handed pitcher.Bobby KieltyAs LHB: .345 OBP/.362 SLG/.708 OPS in 875 at-batsAs RHB: .380 OBP/.487 SLG/.867 OPS in 534 at-batsBobby Kielty has the most equal split between how many at-bats he has had from each side of the plate, but he also has one of the more unequal OPS splits since he is 18% better, in terms of OPS, from the right side than he is from the left.As is the case with most switch-hitters who do not hit similarly from both sides of the plate, Kielty has a wide power imbalance. Not only does he have a slugging percentage .125 points higher from the right side, his isolated power difference (slugging percentage minus batting average), a better indicator of how much true power a player has, is a hefty .71.Perhaps his blinding red hair keeps the Oakland A's and himself from realizing right-handed at-bats are probably the way to go for him.Carl EverettAs LHB: .343 OBP/.468 SLG/.811 OPS in 1,400 at-batsAs RHB: .304 OBP/.381 SLG/.686 OPS in 493 at-batsCarl Everett may not believe in dinosaurs, but he should believe that his 15% disparity in OPS is an indicator that switch-hitting is hurting him more than it is helping.Or since OPS is not found in the Bible, does that mean it doesn't exist?Although Everett is 7 at-bats shy of the 500 at-bat requisite mark, he could hit seven straight homers from the right side and still not bring his OPS percent difference below 10%.Mark BellhornAs LHB: .357 OBP/.383 SLG/.739 OPS in 1,124 at-batsAs RHB: .357 OBP/.509 SLG/.866 OPS in 501 at-batsThere was probably a time when Mark Bellborn thought switch-hitting was a good idea and that he was going to ride it to the major leagues. If so, that day is over, and he should look at the 15% drop-off in OPS and realize it for himself. Since he probably will ignore his split, he will spend the rest of his career in a batter's box where his isolated power is .99 points lower than it is from the right side.Would he be an above average hitter if he concentrated on one side of the plate? We will probably never find out.Jason VaritekAs LHB: .348 OBP/.438 SLG/.787 OPS in 1,453 at-batsAs RHB: .384 OBP/.528 SLG/.912 OPS in 572 at-batsJason Varitek, captain of the Boston Red Sox, may be a surprise addition to this list, but there the numbers do not lie, and they say there is a 14% drop off in OPS. As captain, one can surmise it is Varitek's duty to do all he can to help out his team. Well, one thing he could do to help out the Sox would be to focus solely on his right-handed hitting and see if his numbers improve.Otherwise, he will just continue to tease the Red Sox Nation with his displays of power as a right-handed batter.Carlos GuillenAs LHB: .375 OBP/.463 SLG/.838 OPS in 1,377 at-batsAs RHB: .318 OBP/.415 SLG/.733 OPS in 559 at-batsCarlos Guillen has played for two teams over the past five seasons, but one thing he brought to Detroit from Seattle is his inability to match his left-handed production on the right-handed side of the plate. While the gap between his two OPS's is not as glaring as some of the others on this late, there is no denying the 12% decrease. There is no huge discrepancy in any one category of Guillen's splits, but the accumulation is enough to warrant him putting his switch-hitting career on hold indefinitely.Ray DurhamAs LHB: .357 OBP/.434 SLG/.791 OPS in 1,582 at-batsAs RHB: .386 OBP/.493 SLG/.879 OPS in 515 at-batsRay Durham barely made this list, coming in at a 10% differential, but working under the logic that what he did over the past 2,097 at-bats is probably indicative of his split for his career, maybe his career numbers would be higher than they are.It is probably too late to convince him to stop his switch-hitting now; maybe someone should have told him to stop when he first began. Warning WatchOrlando HudsonAs LHB: .339 OBP/.433 SLG/.772 OPS in 1,377 at-batsAs RHB: .287 OBP/.346 SLG/.633 OPS in 492 at-bats% Diff. 18%D'Angelo JimenezAs LHB: .350 OBP/.402 SLG/.753 OPS in 1,225 at-batsAs RHB: .337 OBP/.327 SLG/.664 OPS in 490 at-bats% Diff. 12%

Is There Increasing Parity in Women's College Basketball?

David Barbour — Mon, 12 Jun 2006 14:59:58 EDT

Forgive me for writing this out of season, but this is a question I have been asking myself for some time. Since there is evidence of increasing parity in the men's college basketball tournament, I wondered if the same was true for the women's college game, which is considerably younger than its male counterpart. For the record, my definition of parity is less concerned with lower seeds upsetting higher seeds and moving deep into the tournament than simply seeing if the margin of victory between the seeds has decreased. To begin with, I looked exclusively at the NCAA women's tournament scores from 1994-2006. The reason I started with 1994 is because that was the first year the tournament field consisted of 64 teams, and there should have been a wider disparity in talent between the top seeds and the bottom ones. Also, this thirteen-year span represented the longest period the women's tournament has kept the same format.In order to determine if there was increasing parity, I took the margin of victory for the higher seeds for all the first round games from 1994-2006 and averaged them together, starting with the 1 vs. 16 match-up, moving onto the 2 vs. 15 match-up, and so on until the 8 vs. 9 games. Whenever there was an upset -- a lower seed defeating a higher seed -- I counted that as a negative margin of victory. After I averaged all the margins of victory, I then split the data into two parts (1994-2000 & 2001-2006). Here are the results.Average Margin of Victory1 vs. 162 vs. 153 vs. 144 vs. 13 5 vs. 126 vs. 117 vs. 108 vs. 91994-200041.925.726.814.54.88.04.30.42001-200639.327.420.015.99.36.67.40.3As the data show, while some lower seeds have managed greater success against the higher seeds, there is no consistent trend to support the hypothesis that there is a lower disparity level between the top teams in the women's tournament and the bottom teams, at least in the first round. Actually, overall, the average difference of margin of victory between the two time frames is 0.0, meaning nothing has changed over the past thirteen years of the 64-team women's tournament field.However, another aspect of parity I wanted to look at was whether lower-seeded mid-majors have closed the gap against the higher-seeded major programs in the nation. My definition of a mid-major team, which I have applied retroactively, is taken from CollegeInsider.com. Even though CollegeInsider.com writes exclusively about men's college basketball, it stands to reason that if a men's program is a mid-major, then its women's counterpart will also be a mid-major.The way I calculated the margin of victory was the same as when I was looking only at lower seeds vs. top seeds, with the exceptions that if a game does not include a mid-major program I do not count it and if the mid-major holds the higher seed, I also do not count that game because if the team does have a higher seed, they are already expected to win so when they do there is nothing to conclude from their victory except that the seeding committee was correct. Here are those results.Average Margin of Victory1 vs. 162 vs. 153 vs. 144 vs. 131994-200039.726.625.015.02001-200639.327.420.316.8The reason I am limited to these four match-ups is because there were simply not enough games for the other seed pairings to allow me to make any conclusions. Similarly to the other look at parity, there is no evidence of a consistent trend of the lowest-seeded mid-majors doing anything to increase the parity between themselves and the highest-seeded majors. The average difference being 0.6 also speaks to the fact that there has been no closing of the talent gap between the first seven years of the 64-team women's tournament field and the latter six.Perhaps there will be increasing parity in the women's NCAA tournament in the future, but right now there is none to speak of.

Wait Until The Nationals Have A New GM

David Barbour — Wed, 7 Jun 2006 16:47:26 EDT

Each season, as the trading deadline approaches, the thirty-two teams that comprise Major League Baseball must all take a long, hard look at themselves and ask if they have a legitimate shot to make the playoffs. If so, should they be looking for that extra piece to the puzzle which may push them over the edge and into a World Series berth? If not, should they declare the season a wash and start trading away players with cumbersome contracts and dwindling skills and hope to rebuild anew the following season by stockpiling prospects?To aid the Washington Nationals, Washington Post columnist Thomas Boswell was kind enough to answer the question for them and point them in the direction he thinks they should go. While the Nationals are probably ecstatic to be receiving advice from a sports writer, the quality of the advice and his overall baseball knowledge is up for debate.On July 27, four days before the trade deadline, the Nationals will be at .500 and on the edges of the NL wild-card race.Wait a minute, how do you know that? Thomas Boswell, are you a psychic? Can you also predict how many inane statements you are going to make in this article? Several, you say? Wonderful.Cut out this prediction so you can send it to me baked in a crow pie. A team that went 30-49 after last July 5th, then was abysmal in spring training and started this season 13-27, is about to inspire talk of a winning year. RFK will bounce again soon.Two other teams who were abysmal in spring training were the Boston Red Sox (9-20) and the Chicago White Sox (10-19).And you want to know two teams who did really awesome in spring training? That's right, the Florida Marlins (19-9) and the Los Angeles Angels (20-11).Now, let's take a quick look at their regular season records up to this point.Boston Red Sox: 33-23Chicago White Sox: 35-22Florida Marlins: 20-36Los Angeles Angels: 26-32Next time you are trying to make an argument for how bad a team is, you might want to leave out the team's spring training record, since spring training rosters are not really indicative of regular season ones.Last year, the Nats had an insanely difficult schedule, playing 104 games against winning teams. If an 81-81 record can be remarkable, theirs was.Actually, Thomas, you may have a point here. The Nationals did outperform their Pythagenport record by four games, but I would not exactly call that remarkable, as teams do better than their Pythagenport record all the time. I would call it good, instead.Last year's Nats were a perfect example with a season progression of 23-18, 1-7, 26-6, 9-24, 18-16 and 4-10. Where's the .500 team in that statistical mess?Funny you should ask. Here's the answer to your rhetorical question. When you add all the wins together and all the losses together and they come out to be the same number, then voila, you have found your .500 team.What's going to keep the Nats from playing 25-19 ball to get to .500? After all, by next week the Nats will have their best pitcher and best hitter of last season, John Patterson and Jose Guillen, back from the disabled list.Actually, their best hitter from last season was Nick Johnson, who in 64 less plate appearances still posted a higher VORP than Jose Guillen (34.1 to 26.6). Johnson also posted a higher OPS+ (139 to 118), a higher MLVr (.258 to .140), and a higher RC/27 (6.69 to 5.46).But John Patterson was their best pitcher and one out of two isn't that bad.What if, after starting the year losing almost every one-run game, they simply evened the odds and won most of them for a while?You mean like the reverse of what they did last year when they went an astounding 24-10 in one-run games before the All-Star Break, but only 6-21 after it, finishing the season with a record of 30-31 in one-run games? Yeah, it could happen.What if, instead of watching walk-off homers in Atlanta and Cincinnati, they returned the sudden-death favors in RFK?I don't know about that. Walk-off homers are improbable in their own right, but when coupled with the fact that while Turner Field is a neutral park and the Great American Ballpark is a slight pitcher's park, RFK Stadium is a severe pitcher's park, making the feat even more improbable for the Washington Nationals.In a few weeks, the Nats may still be stuck in the doldrums, weak schedule or not. But if they rally, if they make their run at .500 or even above it, a crucial juncture will arrive for Washington's new team, its executives and its fans.This is how hard: Say the words: "Trade 'em all. Get prospects. Lose 100 games in '07 and get better draft picks." It hurts, doesn't it? You don't even want to say it (and I don't want to type it).Before you start suggesting that the Nationals trade away all their veterans for prospects, perhaps you should remember that the current GM (for a couple more weeks at least) of the Washington Nationals is drunk driving extraordinaire Jim Bowden. A closer look at Bowden's track record would show you that it might be prudent to save the "trade everyone away" talk until after he is fired, lest he follow your advice and conduct the trades now.As the GM for the Cincinnati Reds GM, he was awful, and as the Nationals GM, Bowden has been no better. Throughout his tenures as GM, he has shown a marked disregard for the effects a home ball park has on a hitter's statistics, thrice trading for Colorado Rockies only to see their offensive production wane after they left the thin air of Coors Field. Bowden has also earned the nickname "Trader Jim" because he seemingly trades players because he has the ability to, which is another reason not to advocate him making more trades. True, he has made some good transactions, but even the worst GMs can get lucky now and again.Last year was a prime example of why Bowden should not be allowed to conduct trades without a grown-up, or at least someone sober, around. Last year, with the Nationals slipping out of first place in the NL East after the All-Star Break, Bowden did everything he could to make sure they would play themselves out of contention by trading away starting pitcher Tomo Ohka (9.9 VORP in 54.0 innings) and signing pitcher Ryan Drese (-1.4 VORP in 59.7 innings). If that was not bad enough, Bowden traded away two other pitchers because obviously pitching is not necessary for a team trying to win a pennant. Maybe it will be best for the Nationals to trade away veterans for prospects, but to do so with Bowden as the GM would be committing an egregious error.

Breaking Down the NBA Finals

David Barbour — Tue, 6 Jun 2006 17:29:17 EDT

Dallas (4) vs. Miami (2)Before the season even began, many "experts" and fans alike had decreed that the 2006 NBA Finals would be a repeat of the 2005 version, starring the team-oriented San Antonio Spurs and Detroit Pistons. Instead, the 2006 Finals pits the Dallas Mavericks against the Miami Heat, two teams who finished second in their respective conferences' regular season standings, and dispatched the supposed "top team" during their playoff runs.Now, not only does this series promise to be supremely exciting, but there are myriad storylines which even the most casual of NBA fans will want to follow. Some of these include: will Pat Riley go down as the most overtanned, leathery head coach to win an NBA title, will Shaq feel "vindicated" after being traded by Kobe Bryant to the Heat, how many hugs must be shrugged off and high-fives ignored before Mark Cuban learns paying his players does not make them his friends, and more importantly, how many times will Avery Johnson hit Josh Howard in the penis while frantically trying to make a substitution. Still, the most important question is who is going to win the series? I have studied some numbers in order to provide the answer.Each team has played seventeen playoff games, only 3.5 games short of a quarter of the NBA season. Therefore, the way they are playing in the postseason provides a better indicator than any regular season team stats. For this reason, all of the stats I use will be strictly from the postseason.First, let's look at how efficiently each team plays, both offensively and defensively. Since teams usually play at different tempos, the best way to compare their efficiency is to pro-rate their possession to 100, thus putting them on a level playing field and eliminating the confounding variable that is tempo.Dallas Mavericks Offense: 114 points per 100 possessions Dallas Mavericks Defense: 108 points per 100 possessionsMiami Heat Offense: 109 points per 100 possessions Miami Heat Defense: 103 points per 100 possessionsIn terms of how much more efficient these teams have been than their opponents, the numbers are the same, as each team has is plus six. Although Dallas scores five more points than does Miami per 100 possessions, they also give up five more points.Some may say if Dallas pushes the pace, there will be no way for the Heat to keep up, but there is no statistical evidence that Dallas has been pushing the ball any faster than the Heat. During the playoffs, Dallas has averaged one more possession on offense and one less possession on defense, which is as close to equal one can get without it being identical.Since this really does not give us a clue as to who will win the series, let's look at how each team gets its points and how they also defend.Dallas Jump Shot Offense: 49.8 points Miami Jump Shot Defense: 44.9 pointsDallas Close Offense: 22.0 points Miami Close Defense: 21.5 pointsDallas Dunk Offense: 5.4 points Miami Dunk Defense: 4.8 pointsDallas Tip Offense: 1.8 points Miami Tip Defense: 1.2 pointsWhile Dallas's offense matches up well against Miami's defense, the biggest difference comes in the jump shot department. Miami's perimeter defense has been susceptible the whole year, and if there is any offense that can exploit this weakness, it is one led by Dirk Nowitzki and Jason Terry.In the other aspects of its offense, Dallas should be able to score at the rate they have so far with no problem.Miami Jump Shot Offense: 39.4 points Dallas Jump Shot Defense: 40.8 pointsMiami Close Offense: 26.3 points Dallas Close Defense: 27.4 pointsMiami Dunk Offense: 11.5 points Dallas Dunk Defense: 6.9 pointsMiami Tip Offense: 0.2 points Dallas Tip Defense: 0.8 pointsNot surprisingly, the Miami Heat has a decided advantage when it comes to scoring in the paint, most notably on dunks. Their interior scoring prowess is not just a result of having Shaq down low, but also comes off Dwyane Wade's drives through the lane which usually end with an alley-oop to Shaq or a monstrous dunk of his own.One positive the Dallas Mavericks can take into this series is knowing that with their extremely deep bench, they have a number of players they can use to defend Shaq and hopefully contain him below his average. Whether or not they succeed remains to be seen.Now, we must look at the net PER the teams get out of their five positions. Net PER is a measure of how much production a team is being given, by a player or an overall position.Point Guard: Neither team's point guards have outplayed their opponents' point guards, but Miami has done a better job of being outplayed at this position. Advantage: Dallas (-0.5 to -4.6)Shooting Guard: Mostly due to having Dwyane Wade on the roster, Miami has a decided edge at this position. Advantage: Miami (+8.8 to -1.7)Small Forward: Maybe Miami shouldn't even play with a small forward. Just kidding. Sort of. Advantage: Dallas (+3.5 to -5.5)Power Foward: Two words: Dirk Nowitzki. Advantage: Dallas (+14.8 to +1.2)Center: Two more words: Shaquille O'Neal. Advantage: Miami (+12.1 to -5.2)Overall Net PER: Miami trumps Dallas by a slim margin (+1.1).Although Miami has a slight edge in overall net PER, Dallas does win the battle at three individual postions and it must be said that Dallas has put up its numbers against superior teams, beating two of the top four regular-season teams (San Antonio and Phoenix), making them slightly more impressive. In addition, the Heat have yet to face a team as deep and as malleable as the Dallas Mavericks. Also, did I mention Dallas has home-court advantage?Prediction: Dallas wins in 7 games.Stats courtesy of 82games.com

Is Chipper Jones Really Underappreciated?

David Barbour — Sun, 4 Jun 2006 11:58:57 EDT

For many sports writers, the temptation to dash off an emotionally resonant article while glossing over certain insignificant details like facts and supporting evidence has proven too great to resist. Such is the case with Atlanta Journal-Constitution columnist Terence Moore, who recently wrote an article headlined, "Chipper Not Appreciated Enough," where, as the title suggests, Moore tried to prove that Larry Wayne "Chipper" Jones was underappreciated as a player. Who exactly is supposed to be underrating Jones as a baseball player is unclear in the article, most likely because there is no such person and Moore realized it the more he wrote.However, this knowledge did not stop Moore from interviewing Chipper's choked-up parents to see if they could shed some light on the mystery of the culprit behind Chipper's non-existent underappreciation:Larry and Lynne Jones nearly wept on Saturday at Turner Field after hearing my [Billy] Williams analogy. They are the parents of baseball's most unappreciated player of consistent goodness along the way to ultimate greatness. When I visited their suite and asked them whether they thought their son would reach the Hall of Fame someday, the mother closed her eyes tightly before crossing her fingers.See what I mean about emotionally resonant over concrete evidence? A common misconception among journalism is that making an interview subject cry means the journalist has done an award-worthy job. Wrong. The real responsibility for a journalist is to present information in a creative, interesting format. It is not to coax the interviewee into incoherent, tear-filled mumbling.The father tried to speak, but a lump in his throat kept getting in the way. "It's hard to believe that my son, from Pierson, Fla., with one caution light and a convenience store, would even be considered for the Hall of Fame," said Larry Jones, Chipper's high school coach, talking and blinking. "Just to make it here [pointing toward the field, where Chipper stood at third base for the Braves] for that matter, but to be considered for the Hall of Fame, it's unbelievable. Unbelievable."Even though Chipper's father cannot tell us just who is the source of Moore's witchhunt, Moore does not let that throw him off the scent of idiocy.Actually, it's believable. You just haven't been paying attention. Few have, and given his swagger of a gunslinger preparing for high noon in the Old West, Jones couldn't care less what you think -- especially if you don't have a tomahawk across your chest.Looking at a player's All-Star appearances and how he fared in the MVP voting is probably the best way to determine how appreciated he is by the public, since the voting for these honors is done by fans and sports writers, respectively. And in both categories, Chipper has acquitted himself very well.He has had five All-Star appearances in his eleven full Major League seasons, which is not bad for a poor defensive fielder playing a defense-intensive position. Also, Chipper has placed in the top 11 of MVP voting seven times. Perhaps he is getting more credit than Moore would like to believe, although thinking you are the only one who realizes something is fun.His selflessness caused him to agree to the second-worst move in the history of Georgia sports when he spent those 2 1/2 years in left field.Actually, wherever Chipper Jones has played, be it third base, shortstop, or left field, he has proven himself to be a below average fielder. The Braves knew this, and so they moved Chipper to a less demanding defensive position, in the hopes he would hurt the team less in the field. Also, Chipper and the Braves had to make way for Vinny Castilla, who was a better defensive third basemen. Unfortunately for the Braves, Castilla performed below average during his stint in the Braves infield.Chipper, meanwhile, performed better defensively in left field than he ever did at third base until a hamstring injury sent him back to third. The three years Chipper spent in the outfield just happens to be the three years where he posted his best Fielding Runs Above Average (-21 FRAA). In no other three year span has Chipper been better defensively.Still, whether or not Chipper Jones is appreciated enough to garner votes on 75% of Hall of Fame cast ballots remains to be seen, but Baseball-Reference.com's HOF Monitor has him listed as a likely Hall of Famer.So is Chipper Jones really underappreciated? Of course not.Was Terence Moore up against it and looking to type up anything that resembled a modicum of effort? Yes.

Cox vs. Schuerholz: Give Me The GM Any Day

David Barbour — Sat, 3 Jun 2006 21:46:21 EDT

Atlanta Journal-Constitution columnist Mark Bradley, in a June 2 article, answered a question I think is safe to say nobody but him is asking. The question, which formed the foundation for his article, was which Atlanta Braves employee, manager Bobby Cox or general manager John Schuerholz, would be harder to replace once they decide to retire.The correct answer to the question seems surprisingly easy, which is why I was shocked when Bradley wrote that Cox is more irreplaceable, thus more valuable to the success of the Braves. Forgetting concrete evidence for a moment, the titles of the positions alone should provide a clue as to which job has more value to a team, but Bradley is intent on anointing Bobby Cox as a god and nothing will deter him from that pursuit. Bradley's lone plank on which he built his shaky argument is the fact that Bobby Cox has sat on the bench for all of the Braves' 15 straight NL East division titles, ignoring that Schuerholz has been the general manager for each of the 15 titles. He also seems to think "one or two other GMs could have stitched together comparable rosters for the price Schuerholz has paid [but] ... no other manager [than Bobby Cox] could have won division titles without them." This is utterly ridiculous.To understand which job is more valuable, we must first examine the descriptions of what each position requires, starting first with the general manager. A general manager is responsible for overseeing the drafting of amateur players, acquiring free agents who will contribute meaningfully, trading for players year round, and making sure the prospects he tradea away do not come back to haunt him. In this last regard, Schuerholz is a certifiable genius. Since he became the Braves GM, Schuerholz has traded away 84 prosects, and of those only six have managed 10 or more Wins Above Replacement Player in their careers. Last year, especially, where the Braves won the NL East title with a roster full of rookies was more a testament to Schuerholz's ability to draft players who will quickly become major league players than it was to anything Cox did during the season.As opposed to a general manager whose job performance is easy to measure by how well the players he acquires perform, a manager's ability is much harder to measure. The prevailing sentiment about the worth of a baseball manager is he only as valuable as his players, which just happen to be provided to him by the general manager. For the most part, there is no statistical evidence one can point to in order to say that is where the manager makes a difference in his team.Throughout the history of baseball, no manager, including the great Bobby Cox, has shown an ability to consistently out-perform their team's projected record according to runs scored and allowed, help their teams by using sacrifice hits, intentional walks, or stolen bases, or improve a team's batting performance.Now, Cox could have helped lead the Braves to 15 straight division titles by fostering an atmosphere in the clubhouse of expecting to win year in and year out. If that were the case, then one must ask why he was unable to lead the Braves to division titles in his first tenure as Braves manager. Methinks the players doth make the difference.In fact, the case can be made that Bobby Cox the general manager was more valuable to the Braves than Bobby Cox the manager. As the general manager, Cox was responsible for acquiring John Smoltz in a trade and drafting players such as Chipper Jones, Kent Mercker, and Mike Stanton, who would later make Cox the manager seem like a managing savant.Furthermore, it is Schuerholz who has been the one to win without Bobby Cox. He won four divisions and a World Series with the Kansas City Royals. One cannot say the same about Cox winning without Schuerholz.So, which one, Cox or Schuerholz, seems more irreplaceable now? That's what I thought.

Chris De Luca Gets A Little Ahead Of Himself

David Barbour — Fri, 2 Jun 2006 18:56:48 EDT

One of the only rules to being a sports columnist for a major metro newspaper is to do everything within your power to avoid sounding like a moron. As easy as this advice may sound, it was still too difficult for Chicago Sun-Times columnist Chris De Luca, who probably would have been better off not penning this article or at least he should have tried to pass it off as Jay Mariotti's work.In the article, De Luca outlines two transations that occurred on a "wild Wednesday afternoon," namely the Cubs trading away Jerry Hairston, Jr. for the services of Texas Ranger Phil Nevin and the biggest transaction of the MLB season to date, Roger Clemens and the Houston Astros coming to terms on a contract. Although he makes the claim that these two transactions will change the landscape of the NL Central, De Luca may be overstating how big of an impact each transaction will have.First, let's look at some choice quotes from De Luca's opinion on the Cubs trade.It was a wild Wednesday afternoon in the National League Central, where two teams that were expected to be much closer to first place on June 1 announced their intentions to keep on playing deep into October.Unfortunately for those with a vested interest in the Cubs' and Astros' seasons, merely stating one's intentions to play deep into the posteason carries little weight. The games still have to be played.But for a Cubs team that had gone into complete paralysis -- from the front office to the back end of the bullpen -- since losing first baseman Derrek Lee on April 19, this was proof that general manager Jim Hendry still has been clocking in for work.If trading for Phil Nevin is the reason why Jim Hendry has been clocking in for work, then the Cubs should change all the locks on their doors and inform Hendry his services will no longer be needed.By acquiring Nevin, Hendry was acquiring a player, who at the age of 35, is a high risk for decline and is already providing evidence that said decline is already taking place. As it stands now, Nevin's 2005 year where he batted .237 BA/.287 OBP/.379 SLG with an OPS+ of 79 (100 is average) while splitting time between the Padres and the Rangers seems to be about what one can expect from Nevin now, especially when added to how he started this season (.216 BA/.301 OBP/.415 SLG), as a DH. Numbers like that are never palatable to a baseball club, and taste even worse when being served up by a 1B/DH.However, maybe moving back to the National League and playing in the field is just what Nevin needs to help him find his eye at the plate. If only he was a good enough fielder to warrant him being put at first base day in and day out. Too bad he isn't.Nobody wants manager Dusty Baker to earn a contract extension more than Hendry does.I don't know about that one. I could think of lots of people who want Baker to earn a contract extension more than Hendry, starting with the rest of the NL Central.So he increased the odds in Baker's favor with a legitimate power threat at first base.Legitimate may be a strong word here. Barely adequate would have been my phrase of choice. Nevin's .415 SLG ranks him 20th out the 26 eligible first basemen. If Nevin somehow manages to match his career slugging average of .475, that would push him up to only 14th out of 26. Again, legitimate power threat is a reach.Nevin, 35, had a career year in 2001 with the Padres, hitting .306 with 41 home runs and 126 RBI.If the basis of an argument for why Nevin might be a good addition for the team is what he did five years ago, then there is a problem. On the other hand, if you think of this is infallible reasoning, then the Cubs should re-sign Sammy Sosa. In 2001, he hit .328 with 64 home runs and 160 RBI.Now let's look at some of the gems De Luca leaves us with when discussing Roger Clemens' acquisition. Rookies Taylor Buchholz and Fernando Nieve helped the Astros' rotation get off to a solid start, sparking talk in April that maybe they didn't need Clemens. By Wednesday, it was clear the Astros desperately need Clemens.While there is little doubt that adding Clemens to the Astros starting rotation will improve it tremendously, it is easy to simply anoint him as the savior of the Astros and wash your hands of the issue. This would be taking a simplistic view of the whole matter, especially in light of last season. Clemens' 2005 season was the poster child for why a pitcher's win-loss record is one of the more overrated stats in baseball. Despite having the second-best WHIP and ERA+ of his career and leading the league in ERA, his record still stood at only 13-8. Of the thirty-two games Clemens started, the Astros won fifteen and lost the other seventeen, mostly because the Astros gave him lousy run support; they were shutout seven times while Clemens was on the mound. The real key to whether or not the Astros can turn around their season, provided Clemens pitches at his 2005 level, is whether Andy Pettitte can somehow recreate the magic he had in 2005. So far this season, Pettitte has pitched much worse than he did last season and in most parts of his career. His pitches thrown per plate appearance (4.10) and pitches thrown per inning (16.9) are the highest they have ever been and his K/BB ratio (2.35) has regressed back to the mean after his stellar 2005 K/BB ratio (4.17). Not to mention his OPS-against (.965) is off-the-charts bad.Last year, the Astros had three of the five best pitchers in baseball. This year, they have one of the fifteen best pitchers. That one's name is Roy Oswalt.Astros starting pitchers had yielded a .278 batting average -- only the Phillies' .287 mark was higher in the NL entering Wednesday.Batting average-against is one of the poorest indicators for how well a pitcher is performing. This is because a pitcher has absolutely no control over what happens to a ball after it is put in play. All the pitcher can do is hope the ball goes directly to one of his teammates who can then get a putout. He cannot command the ball to do so.Also, there is no correlation between BABIP (Batting Average on Balls in Play) and how good a pitcher is. A good pitcher is as likely to have a high BABIP as a poor pitcher is to have a low one. In addition, having a low BABIP is not a repeatable skill for a pitcher. What a pitcher's BABIP is in one season has no bearing on what it will be in the next season. The three statistics a pitcher has the most control over are his strikeout rate, walk rate, and home run rate (home runs are not technically in play).If the Astros do make the playoffs for the third year in a row, it will not be solely because of Roger Clemens.