Of Mice and Men: What it Means to be Human
Published May 25, 2005
In the Christian tradition, this has often been described in terms of the "image of God," taken from Genesis 1:26, in which God is said to make humans in his image and likeness. This concept of humans as image-bearers has had a rich history, and has contributed on many fronts to a more accurate view of who we are as human beings.
For example, within the original Ancient Near Eastern (ANE) context of this passage in Genesis, the language of "image-bearing" would have been immediately understandable. When a vassal or representative spoke or acted with the authority of the king, he was said to "bear the king's image," a physical representation of the king and his authority.
There are, of course, no rights or privileges without responsibility, so on the heels of the creation of human beings and their placement in dominion, we find the corresponding responsibilities and blessings in terms of "stewardship."
Here again we run up against the political and social structure of the ANE. A steward was one who was in charge of a household or kingdom during the ruler's absence. Humans, in exercising their exalted place of stewardship, are to be productive and creative rulers of the earth. This is a norm of human existence and the standard to which we are called.
The implications of this for scientific pursuits in general, and genetics in particular, are manifold. The pursuit of scientific or technological progress for its own sake should never be considered the highest good. A scientific pragmatism, which views humans and animals primarily in terms of utility, will always be an inadequate guide for ethical considerations. It violates the dignity of human beings as image-bearers of God and abandons the norms of responsible stewardship.
Sadly, it is just such a rationale that is in play in the New York Times editorial, which itself is an exemplar of the attitude among many scientists today. The guidelines on embryonic stem cell research recently released by the National Academies of Science address the chimera phenomenon, stating that the creation of chimeras is "valuable in understanding the etiology and progression of human disease and in testing new drugs, and will be necessary in preclinical testing of human embryonic stem cells and their derivatives."
Human experimentation has been circumscribed by the Nuremberg Code, for example, following the atrocities committed during World War II, despite the protestations that "such experiments yield results for the good of society that are unprocurable by other methods or means of study." So too should ethical guidelines addressing the creation of chimeras realize that there are objective norms that must be adhered to, independent of purely pragmatic concerns. Our very humanity may depend on it.
- Of Mice and Men: What it Means to be Human
- Published: May 25, 2005
- Type: Opinion
- Section: Sci/Tech
- Filed Under: Politics: Law and Rights, Sci/Tech: Science, Culture: Religion, Culture: Media
- Writer: Jordan J. Ballor
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- Jordan J. Ballor's personal site
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Comments
bhw,
Thanks for reading the post and responding.
Christian norms are not "objective" norms, by definition.
I guess it depends on what you mean by "objective." Orthodox Christianity is not objective in the sense that it treats all claims equally, but it is objective in the sense that it deals with reality, what is out there (the world) and in here (the human person).
I cited the Nuremberg Code as an example of a way of placing limits on scientific research because of the reality of the dignity of the human person. I'm not sure whether or not the Nuremberg Code would only protect only "human beings with the legal capacity to make decisions," I'm inclined to think that babies, for example, would also be protected from research. I'm not familiar with the specifics of the code, however, so I won't belabor that point. In the end, again, the NC is just an example, not the be all, end all of bioethics.
Your definition of a human person appears to necessarily include "the legal capacity to make decisions" and at least some measure of "intellectual abilities." Admittedly these may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for personhood to you, but defining these as necessary conditions for being human seem problematic to me.
Who (or what) is excluded based on these criteria? Babies? Under your definition, how mentally retarded can a person be and still be a human? Is yours an ethic something like Peter Singer's? Or is it something like this guy's?
Now some of the readily perceivable objective moral norms might be represented to a greater or lesser degree by various religious traditions. I suggest reading C.S. Lewis on the Tao as a primer to at least one version of Christian moral realism.
I have to run out for a while, but to quickly reply....
My point about Nuremberg was to show that there is a vast difference between a clump of cells in a petri dish and a living, breathing human man/woman/child being experimented upon in a Nazi camp. They are not at all equivalent.
I suggest reading C.S. Lewis on the Tao
Well, I've read "The Tao of Pooh"!
That's it for now....
there is a vast difference between a clump of cells in a petri dish and a living, breathing human man/woman/child being experimented upon in a Nazi camp. They are not at all equivalent.
The questions raised by such a statement underscore my previous queries: where exactly do you draw the line?
You seem to have added the charicteristics of "living" and "breathing" to your previous descriptions...are we now including children as human beings?
And as an aside, I can't help noting that the Nazis de-humanized their victims in order to deaden the consciences of those carrying out the atrocities. So that a Nazi might just well say something like "there is a vast difference between a Jew in a concentration camp and a living, breathing Aryan German." In such a view, one is human, the other is not.
thanks Jordan - I agree entirely that humans are more than just material beings, but I don't agree that pieces of them, or even pre-humans, are more than material things. I believe the line must remain at viability outside the womb for human being-ness
Eric, thanks for sharing your view of "the line." I think such a view is probably the majority view in America.
One of my fears, however, is that such a definition is going to be quickly obsolete...what need have we of "wombs" when we can use test tubes and petri dishes instead? In such cases do you simply substitute "test tube" for "womb" in your definition?
that is an excellent point and it does concern me: clearly the line of viability has moved earlier and earlier into pregnancy. Perhaps the line will have to be "viability without extraordinay measures," but i do realize this opens up many issues and questions
You seem to have added the charicteristics of "living" and "breathing" to your previous descriptions...are we now including children as human beings?
Jordan, now you're just being difficult.
YOU brought up the Nuremberg Code. I was just clarifying for you what the Nuremberg Code says about human experimentation:
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected; and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
The Nuremberg Code isn't defining what a human is or isn't. The Code is defining which humans can/should be considered for inclusion in medical experiments.
My point, perhaps poorly stated, was that clumps of cells are not humans and therefore not covered by the Nuremberg code. Human babies, of course, would be covered by the code -- and therefore not considered candidates for experimentation -- since they're actually humans and are not able to make the decision themselves to be a part of the experiment.
And as an aside, I can't help noting that the Nazis de-humanized their victims in order to deaden the consciences of those carrying out the atrocities.
Fuck you and your comparison of me to Nazis.
bhw,
You are right, I did bring up the Nuremberg Code, and as I said explicitly in the piece, and again in the comments, it was intended to be an example of a check placed on scientific "progress" in favor of objective norms of human dignity. In any case, I think you are correct that babies would be excluded, because the assumption is that it is wrong to experiment on humans unless these conditions are met. There is thus clearly a prejudice against human experimentation in the Nuremberg Code, a positive defense must be made for why such research should be conducted. In contemporary debates about genetic manipulation, the opposite attitude seems to be in place...the burden of proof is on those who question the research.
I certainly did not intend my observation about the Nazis to forestall debate or discussion, but it's a historical fact that the inhuman treatment of human beings is very often accomplished by dehumanizing the oppressed party. It's certainly not a phenomenon unique to the Nazis, and can be found, for example, in the American chattel slavery system, or (arguably) in the Indian caste system.
The point is to illustrate the critical importance of defining what exactly human life is and the consequences that too narrow definitions might have. I'm sure you know that ascribing personhood to something (or not doing so) is a very serious thing.
I'm curious what you or others might have to say about the merits of an argument from potentiality for human value. It might be akin to something like Aquinas' view of final causality re: the function of a thing. I can explicate this more if need be.
I certainly did not intend my observation about the Nazis to forestall debate or discussion, but it's a historical fact that the inhuman treatment of human beings is very often accomplished by dehumanizing the oppressed party.
Cells in a laboratory are NOT human beings; therefore, they cannot be oppressed parties. The Nazi comparison is bull [not to mention offensive], as is the American slavery comparison.
The point is to illustrate the critical importance of defining what exactly human life is and the consequences that too narrow definitions might have. I'm sure you know that ascribing personhood to something (or not doing so) is a very serious thing.
Well, I know what it isn't, and it isn't an embryo in a lab. You dismiss and belittle the horror of the Holocaust when you liken experiments on embryos to the Nazi experiments on Jews.
I'm curious what you or others might have to say about the merits of an argument from potentiality for human value.
I don't see much merit in it at all. An embryos in a laboratory has the potential to become a human life, but that potential does not make it yet human.
Well, I know what it isn't, and it isn't an embryo in a lab
Cells in a laboratory are NOT human beings
clumps of cells are not humans
there is a vast difference between a clump of cells in a petri dish and a living, breathing human man/woman/child
Clumps of human cells have no such capacity. Nor do they have any intellectual abilities. They're not humans. They're cells.
Merely asserting something over and over again doesn't make it true. I've tried to cull out an argument for you, but you seem unwilling, and call me "difficult" when I try to do so.
What exactly are your parameters for defining a human person? You seem to be saying that it is simply self-evident that an embryo is not a human life. Is that the extent of your argument?
Because your categories are confusing to me. An embryo is "life" but not "human." At what point does it become "human." Viability outside the womb? When it can breathe on its own? Or when it makes decisions on its own? NOTA (none of the above)?
You were being difficult because you were putting words into my mouth, probably because you were anticipating a different discussion than the one I started.
Certainly, the cells are "alive." If we found some frozen amoeba on Mars, we'd all be saying we found "life" on Mars. But I don't think any of us would question whether or not those organisms should be given some sort of legal or moral status.
So embryos, again, are not humans. And yes, to me that is self-evident.
I've avoided defining what a human is so that we could avoid the inevitable devolution into an abortion discussion, which is essentially a meaningless debate because nobody ever changes his/her mind as a result.
But in my opinion, an embryo develops into a fetus, which becomes a human life either very late in pregnancy or at birth.
bhw - I'm curious about your hangup with the "clumps of cells." It seems to me that you're drawing an arbitrary line about when a clump of cells becomes a full person. Is it when the cells form a blastopore? Is it the development of a neuron? Aren't I still just a clump of cells, albeit a few more than an embryo? Has my DNA changed somehow - ushering me into personhood rather than "clump"? Don't my cells still operate in similar, if not the same, ways as embyrotic cells did?
According to your understanding of a person, or so it seems, I'm just a random clump of cells that just happens to possess some random electrical signals jumping from a clump of cells in one part of my brain to a clump of cells located around my forarms causing me to type this. Lets terminate me before I gain one more clump of cells, because I might not be a real person yet.
bhw - I'm curious about your hangup with the "clumps of cells."
I don't have a hangup with clumps of cells. You asked me to define a human life, and I said, over and over, that cells in a petri dish or laboratory were not human life, meaning that they have no legal or moral status.
Then I just explained that, to me, *human* life begins late in pregnancy or at childbirth.
According to your understanding of a person, or so it seems, I'm just a random clump of cells that just happens to possess some random electrical signals jumping from a clump of cells in one part of my brain to a clump of cells located around my forarms causing me to type this.
Mmmmm...nope. Never said that. But based on this discussion thread, I'm starting to think you might be onto something!
Lets terminate me before I gain one more clump of cells, because I might not be a real person yet.
You know, I hesitated to comment on your post in the first place, and the two quotes above are excactly why. It's yet another example of a pro-lifer who can do no better than resort to the "let's kill all the babies and retarded people" line of b.s.
Once again, if you can't see the difference between experiments on 256-cells in a petri dish and experiments on children and adults in concentration camps, then I can't help you.
please read a bie about human embryology before you start to open that big mouth of yours.






Very well written piece, although I disagree with your conclusions.
First, the Nuremberg Code refers to human beings with the legal capacity to make decisions. Clumps of human cells have no such capacity. Nor do they have any intellectual abilities. They're not humans. They're cells.
Second, after discussing the Christian perspective of the role of humans on this planet, you conclude:
So too should ethical guidelines addressing the creation of chimeras realize that there are objective norms that must be adhered to, independent of purely pragmatic concerns.
Christian norms are not "objective" norms, by definition.
I'm not saying that we don't have to evaluate the ethics of scientific research, but it's laughable to suggest that any one religion can present us with an objective ethical code.