Ignatieff also delves into the history of political terror, reminding the reader of interesting tidbits from the Russian anarchists of the late 1800s, the burgeoning American communist terrorist movement of the early 20th century (smashed by the Palmer Raids shortly after WWI), the Red Brigades and the Baader-Meinhof gang.

Somewhat surprisingly, almost no mention is made of the American terrorist movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s (such as the Weather Underground), and little attention is paid to the mechanics of the Canadian federal government's squashing of separatist terrorist violence in the 1970s (by means of invoking special war powers). But there are examinations of many other attempts to counter terrorism, from Northern Ireland to Sri Lanka.

Ignatieff fares less well when he attempts to translate his analysis to (a) the war on Iraq and (b) what he refers to as "apocalyptic terror" (i.e., terrorists equipped with weapons of mass destruction). With regard to the latter, he notes that the potential civilization-ending threat of apocalyptic terror calls into question the efficacy of his proposed evaluative system, but instead of confronting that, his argument seems to trail off without coming to any discernable conclusion. In short, his framework seems workable for the sort of terrorist activities which we've all seen before, but it's not clear whether it's appropriate to handle a situation involving WMDs, nor a situation (perhaps as yet unrealized) where in a major confrontation between states one of the primary tactics is apocalyptic terror. In a similar vein, Ignatieff's attempt to link his analysis to the war in Iraq (which might be a strategic part of the war on terror but isn't tactically) stumbles badly; which is surprising, because Ignatieff usually writes quite lucidly (if, in my view, incorrectly) on Iraq (see, for example, here). In the end, his attempts to wield an evaluative framework explicitly geared towards domestic politics on (a) a tactic which would entirely destroy that domestic politics and (b) on the vagaries of foreign policy mars an otherwise excellent book.

Grade: A