On Sunday, 3/29, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice appeared on CBS's 60 Minutes; unlike Richard Clarke, Rice refused to admit responsibility for her role in the worst national security failure in American history, and stopped short of apologizing to the families who lost loved ones on 9/11.

Her manner varied from somnambulent to the look of a chicken on a freeway, and like others in the Administration, she avoided making direct answers, instead choosing to restate vague generalities in the hope that the reporter would move on.

As a matter of fact, the basic thrust of her interview was "9/11 was bad, but let's move on" — which is what you'd expect from a habitual liar and someone with something to hide.

But true to form, she nervously stumbled when telling the LIES and DISTORTIONS that follow:

RICE'S LIE: "The administration took seriously the threat" of terrorism before 9/11.

FACTS:
* President Bush himself acknowledges that, despite repeated warnings of an imminent Al Qaeda attack, before 9/11 "I didn't feel the sense of urgency" about terrorism. ("Bush At War" by Bob Woodward)
* Newsweek reports that his attitude was reflected throughout an Administration that was trying to "de-emphasize terrorism" as an overall priority.
* Only two of the hundred national security meetings the Administration held during this period addressed the terrorist threat;
* The White House never held one meeting of its counterterrorism task force. (wash. post)
* The Administration was actively trying to cut funding for counterterrorism, and "vetoed a request to divert $800 million from missile defense into counterterrorism" despite a serious increase in terrorist chatter in the summer of 2001.(newsweek & veto)

RICE'S DISENGENUOUS WHINE: "I don't know what a sense of urgency any greater than the one we had would have caused us to do anything differently. I don't know how...we could have done more. I would like very much to know what more could have been done?"

FACTS:
* the Administration could have stopped trying to de-emphasize terrorism in the months before 9/11;
* the Administration could have stopped trying to cut funding for counterterrorism in the months before 9/11;
* the Administration could have held more meetings of top principals to get the directors of the CIA and FBI to share information, especially during the major intelligence spikes occurring in the summer of 2001.

(9/11 Commissioner Jamie Gorelick said on ABC this morning, the lack of focus and meetings meant agencies were not talking to each other, and key evidence was overlooked. With better focus and more urgency, the FBI's discovery of Islamic radicals training at flight schools might have raised red flags. Similarly, the fact that "months before Sept. 11, the CIA knew two of the al-Qaeda hijackers were in the United States" could have spurred a nationwide manhunt. But because there was no focus or urgency, "No nationwide manhunt was undertaken," said Gorelick. "The State Department watch list was not given to the FAA. If you brought people together, perhaps key connections could have been made.")