As for the slippery slope - well, those arguments (like those raised here, along the lines of "now it's money, next it'll be adult material") can be valid if argued and analyized properly. It's easy to say that some sort of legal or policy decision won't be extended into another area, but the temptation always exists. In analyizing a slippery slope argument, however, it is necessary to determine whether there is in fact sufficient similarity to justify the comparison. For example, between money and pornographic images. There are some sizeable economic and policy issues related to interfering with the ability to display a completely accurate copy of money. The policy issues related to porn are more murky, and would of course engender more debate over free speech or expression (I don't think free speech or expression covers the ability to make one's own currency).

As for comparisons to copyrighted material, I find it intriguing that many artists are simultaneously trying to have software developers design such protections (like digital watermarks, etc) into their software. In other words, if I design a beautiful picture in Photoshop, I might want to be able to prevent others from opening or editing the file. That's something many artists ask for. Is it then some sort of "Big Brother" thing to build such items into the software? I think not. Which makes the slippery slope argument quite weak indeed.

As far as the last argument, however, it does appear to have at least some measure of merit.

Another security expert, Gene Spafford of Purdue University, said Adobe should have notified its customers prominently. He wondered how closely Adobe was permitted to study the technology's inner workings to ensure it was stable and performed as advertised.

"If I were the paranoid-conspiracy type, I would speculate that since it's not Adobe's software, what else is it doing?" Spafford said.

That is the potential kicker here: does the software do more than feature some sort of "deterent" to counterfeiting, or does it have other features as well (say, like an instant notification of the Secret Service or something). That, however, is a challenge to the actual operation of the code, not the propriety of placing it in the software to begin with. Overall, I'd say the objections to anti-counterfeit technology are weak, and the only real issue is whether this code is narrowly tailored to the intended purpose.

Note: The author wastes a considerable amount of time writing about a variety of topics over at Walloworld, where this post originally appeared.