An interview with Stephen Unwin
Published December 22, 2003
Importantly, I argue, there is a third type of proposition for which only a faith type belief would apply and not the logical belief. The reason I argue that is that there are certain propositions that are structured in a way where words are not being used in that proposition in their conventional application. There is really no logical foothold on what that proposition really means. And I try to make really clear in the beginning of the book that without a logical definition you have no starting point for a probability analysis because that really relies on you having an up front well-defined proposition. I give some examples of this. For example the proposition that God created the universe. For me that is a proposition for which you can have a faith belief but not a rational belief because that sentence is not using word in their conventional sense. We know what the word "made" means or "to make" but that is not really what that means in the context of that sentence. Making is an act that takes place in time, it is a construction, whereas creation of the universe - in the words of St. Augustine - the universe was not created in time but was created with time. Time is an actual component of the universe just the way space is, I mean that is what comes out of Einstein's theory of general relativity that time and space are actual components of the universe; they are not just a backdrop against which the universe exists.
So when someone says: "God made the world" I for one, when I think about it rationally, don't know what it means. So I have no starting point for which to do a probability analysis. One might have an intuitive understanding of what that means. It might mean that the world is somehow imbued with that distinction between right and wrong, between good and evil, and compassion versus indifference. So I might have a feeling inside me about what it means when someone says God made the world but certainly that feeling is no basis by which to do a probability analysis. I argue that many of the propositions that distinguish one religion from another are of that nature. So if someone says to me Jesus is the Son of God or Jesus is God as a Christian I attach belief to that. But I fully recognize within myself that it is faith belief. Now someone comes along and says that Jesus is not God. Well I argue, how can you have faith in that proposition; what does it mean? It is not like a logical proposition where you have the proposition and then the negation that is the opposite. Then you can attach a probability to one and the opposite to the negation. Faith just doesn't work the same way; I mean how can you have faith that Jesus isn't the Son of God? So that was the argument I tried to make was that faith type propositions don't have the negations that logical propositions do. So there is no real basis for conflict in my mind. It is a sort of vacuous thing to argue one versus the other.
- An interview with Stephen Unwin
- Published: December 22, 2003
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- Section: Interviews
- Filed Under: Books, Books: Philosophy, Books: Spirituality
- Writer: Kevin Holtsberry
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Thanks Kev, fascinating topic very well covered. Thanks again for the champagne - you are the coolest.