Consider the following two points:

Point One.

Iran is close to having a nuclear arsenal. Whether or not it is secretly enriching uranium, it has precursor materials as well as a nuclear reactor. According to the Department of State,

Iran has acknowledged both the heavy water production plant at Arak and the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, but did so only after their existence was disclosed to the press in August 2002 by an Iranian opposition group.

Aside from a small IAEA-safeguarded "zero-power" research reactor located at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center, Iran has no known heavy water reactor and no need for an indigenous source of heavy water. Iran's only nuclear power reactor expected to become operational within the next decade is the light-water reactor under construction with Russian help at Bushehr. This raises serious questions about Iran's intentions in constructing an industrial-scale heavy water production plant at Arak. Heavy-water moderated reactors are better suited for plutonium production than are light water reactors. We believe Iran's true intent is to develop the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, using both the plutonium route (supported ultimately by a heavy-water research reactor) and the highly enriched uranium route (supported by a gas centrifuge enrichment plant).

Iran has also confirmed to the IAEA that it is constructing a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility near the town of Natanz. Although Iran initially delayed the visit, IAEA Director General ElBaradei visited the Natanz site in late February and found what appeared to be a "sophisticated" centrifuge uranium enrichment program. We are deeply concerned at Iran's efforts to build that facility clandestinely, and believe there is no logical reason for Iran to pursue uranium enrichment other than to support a weapons capability, especially in light of Russia's pledge to provide all the fuel for the lifetime of the Bushehr reactor.

There has been a great deal of speculation as to why Iran would be developing nuclear power considering its oil reserves, and Stefan Sharkansky has questioned whether a weapons program makes any sense in light of Israeli deterrence. Of course, Ayatollah Rafsanjani has urged Muslims to use nuclear weapons against Israel, but that is not the same as saying Iran intends to do it directly.

Well, how about indirectly? This leads to my other point.

Point Two

There is accumulating evidence that the top leadership of al Qaida is now located in Iran. Accounts vary as to exactly who is there, how long they have been there, or the details of their residence, but I think there are too many reports to be ignored. (See al Jazeera, Fox News, Two stories in The Hindu, WorldNetDaily — as well as BLOG-IRAN.)