As a result, ideologues can never completely disavow struggle; if they stop “moving,” they have no purpose. As Winning explains, the U.S. was therefore unable to placate the Soviets and will be unable to mollify future cold war ideological foes; similarly, 9/11 resulted from irreconcilable and irrational animus, not the apologist’s pabulum of poverty and legitimate “root causes.” Nichols embraces the truth: no permanent peaceful coexistence is possible with forces that dream of the West’s destruction.

Precluded from total war, cold warriors must conduct their struggle by other means. Beyond an arms race and the propaganda wars, cold war opponents can express themselves in peripheral venues, e.g. by aiding and/or fighting proxies. Given the ideological state’s unquenchable thirst for expansion, the U.S. made understandable efforts to counter Communism in Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and other countries. Nichols argues that although often maligned, our Korean and Vietnamese efforts played significant, if uncertain roles in slowing Moscow. Whether Vietnam was worth the price we paid, by the time Saigon fell the Soviet economy had permanently stopped growing. As a general rule, retarding the enemy’s momentum is an important element of fighting a cold war.

Although detente afforded the U.S. a chance to recover from Vietnam and to conclude arms control agreements, Nichols argues persuasively against those in the West who viewed detente as a desirable long-term situation. Because of the USSR’s ideological underpinnings, Moscow viewed detente as a means to place a veneer of cooperation over continued expansionism in an atmosphere of Western reluctance to interfere lest the Potemkin cooperation crumble. In the 1970s, however, détente delivered the time and stability that enabled the U.S. to emerge in the 1980s with renewed confidence and strength. Detente was an effective tactic but would be a foolish strategy against a cold war opponent .

Winning provides a much needed scholarly analysis of the Carter and Reagan contributions to the Cold War. Those who wish to debate the strengths and weaknesses of the 39th and 40th Presidents should definitely arms themselves with a copy of Winning. While understandably critical of Carter’s inconsistent approach and impractical “linkage” of arms control and human rights, Nichols reminds us that some of the Soviet aggression that so befuddled Carter stemmed from the permissive détente of his predecessors. Additionally, Carter receives credit for belatedly channeling his exasperation with the Brezhnev regime into a nascent defense build-up and concurrent upward racheting of his rhetoric.