America’s victory in the Cold War has inexplicably and unfortunately started to fade from the national consciousness even though the campaign against Communism provides a successful model for fighting cold wars, including the current struggle against Islamo-Fascism. Fortunately, Thomas M. Nichols, a Professor at the U.S. Naval War College, has masterfully filled a crucial gap in the contemporary discourse with Winning the World: Lessons for America’s Future from the Cold War. Nichols deserves credit for simultaneously providing an indispensable guide to cold wars and a fascinating true story.

Drawing upon his extensive background in Russian-Soviet affairs and political science, Nichols convincingly argues that highly ideological opponents such as the USSR and al-Qaeda place similar strategic obstacles in the path of the free societies that they oppose. Responsive tactics will necessarily vary by adversary, but Nichols’ strategic framework provides a reliable basis for devising the appropriate tactics for a given enemy.

Meticulously researched and documented, Winning is also exceptionally well written, striking an ideal balance between general accessibility and academic rigor. Platitudes need not apply, nor do unsupported opinions. Nichols’ command of the material is evident, as his passion for the subject (he is also the author of The Sacred Cause, an intriguing look at Soviet civil-military relations and an interesting 20th century backstory). Despite Winning’s serious subject matter, the author does not hesitate to admit an occasional dash of humor into the discussion—of course, many Soviet high jinks suggest themselves.

Nichols asserts that “cold wars” generally comprise two hostile powers locked in mutually declared hostilities that elude final resolution because both sides possess a sufficient nuclear deterrent to price a direct attack out of the geopolitical market. Forced to abstain from overt war, the competing entities must continue their struggle in all manner of secondary theaters without capitulating and without pushing the opponent too far.

Victory in the “Cold War does not mean the end of cold wars,” of course. While al-Qaeda and its progeny and allies have evidently not yet acquired the necessary nukes to hold the West at bay, Nichols warns that atomically-armed Islamo-Fascists are a likely future cold war antagonist. Beijing, Pyongyang, and Teheran are also incubators for potential cold war combatants. These unpleasant truths underscore Winning’s central contention: that we discard our Cold War experiences at our own peril.

Notwithstanding the tendency in Western intellectual circles to overemphasize “realist” theories of behavior, Nichols pays proper heed to the importance of ideology in shaping motivations. Indeed, Marxist ideology played a central role in the 1945-1991 contest; the ideology of extreme fundamentalist Islam has galvanized the 9/11 generation. Because ideologues hold as sacred the cause of transforming the world to conform to their beliefs, ideological movements must always “move” toward their goal.