...and that's no surprise, according to my friend D. Griboyedev, who follows Russian affairs closely. Here's his lowdown on what's really going on between the U.S. and Russia, some of which you haven't seen in the Western press...

Some time at last to comment on the Russian political situation as you saw it, as you asked in reference to this post. I seriously doubt that either a substantive positive change in our policy towards Russia, or a corresponding move towards a "stable, democratic, prosperous Russia" are likely—rather the opposite, because our policies are effectively designed to do just the opposite.

While the analogy of today's Russia as Pinochet's Chile is true up to a point, Putin is neither Pinochet nor one of the old Communist General Secretaries when it comes to control over his own government, or in the ability to ignore popular opinion. As a former KGB officer, Putin's base of support is in the security services, and he has tried to move people from there into commanding positions in the other "power ministries" (e.g., the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Atomic Energy, etc.) However, the security services have less physical and bureaucratic power than the coalition of the uniformed military and the other "power ministries." They effectively put Putin into power after Yeltsin's cave-in over Kosovo, and only support him as long as, and as far as, his position coincides with theirs. This is why Putin's public behavior and statements always follow a pattern: when an international crisis or other question of power arises, he says nothing for a fairly lengthy period while leaders of the other power centers make statements and take action. Finally, he comes down on the side of whichever group seems to have the most power at the time, without acknowledging that he's doing so.

A classic example of this came when Chechen guerillas under Shamil Basayev and Khattab had been driven back into Chechnya after attacking Dagestan in 1999. The U.S. was demanding that Russia take no further action. In response, Colonel-General Anatoly Kvashnin (Chief of the General Staff) and several other senior officers told Putin that they intended to pursue Basayev et al into Chechnya and destroy the rebels once and for all—and that if Putin refused, they would not be responsible for what happened next, with a strong hint that he would be removed from power as Yeltsin had been. Shortly thereafter, Putin made his famous remark about how the rebels would be killed wherever they were, "in the shithouse if necessary." Another example of this pattern came last August. After months of Russian protests to Georgia about Chechen rebels using the Pankisi Gorge (just on the Georgian side of the northern Caucasus Mountains, with ready access to mountain passes into Chechnya) as a sanctuary, repeated denials of knowledge and responsibility by Georgia, and warnings from the U.S. about Georgian sovereignty, the Russian Air Force bombed the gorge without warning. Again, Putin was silent for days, then came down with a bang on the military's side, causing a panic in Tbilisi that hasn't really subsided since then. The most telling indicator that Putin doesn't have Stalin-like power in all of this is that Kvashnin is not only still alive, but still the Chief of the General Staff—and is still very provocative towards the U.S. and Georgia.